The delegation that came from Beijing to Moscow consisted of General Secretary K. Tokuda, S. Nosaka, R. Nishizawa and S. Hakamada, representing the opposition group.  The delegation arrived at the very end of April 1951 and remained in the Soviet Union for about a month and a half.  During this time there were four meetings with Stalin.  In the intervals between meetings, the Japanese comrades had the opportunity to seek medical care and rest. Tokuda, Nosaka, and Nishizawa were housed in a dacha near Moscow and Hakamada lived in an apartment in Moscow [on Gorkii street].

            All of the meetings took place at Stalin’s dacha in Kuntsevo.[1] On our side, always present were V. Molotov and V. Grigorian,[2] who handled all matters related to the Japanese comrades’ stay in Moscow.

            I was constantly with Tokuda, Nosaka, and Nishizawa. It is noteworthy that during their whole Moscow stay they did not meet with Hakamada.  Actually, we were all together at the dacha much of the time waiting for Stalin’s summons. During the May holidays, we observed the demonstration and military parade, making several trips through the streets of the city, brightly decorated for May Day and Victory Day. [May 9]  One day in conversation, I mentioned Hakamada. Tokuda and Nosaka, however, with disdain announced that, although he had come to Moscow, they did not want to know where he was, and even less to meet with him.

            The rather tiresome waiting [period] ended several days after Victory Day.  V. Grigorian called the dacha and asked if the Japanese comrades were ready to meet with the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] leadership in two or three hours.  Nosaka replied that they were ready to meet at any time, but without Hakamada.  Nosaka and his comrades were afraid that arguments could start during the conversation and Hakamada would criticize them to the benefit of his own group.

            A government automobile came for us and we went to Stalin’s dacha in Kuntsevo.  Stalin met the guests dryly, without greetings, limiting himself to handshakes.  After introductions, the business conversation began immediately.

            Stalin began by opening in front of me a brochure of the decisions of the CPJ’s Fourth Conference decisions, pointing to a paragraph and telling me to translate it.  It said that in extraordinary circumstances the Central Committee could lead the party without convening a session [of the Conference].  Then he asked Tokuda if he was in agreement with this conference decision. Tokuda replied that he was in full accord, since he himself had written the decision draft.

            Stalin approved of this reply and said that such situations had also occurred in the history of our party.

            Then  Stalin asked Tokuda, why hadn’t Shiga [Yoshio] [3] come.  Tokuda replied that Shiga had a difficult family situation and that instead of him his supporter Hakamada had come.  “It seems you wanted to come earlier. What kept you from coming?” asked Stalin.  The guests hesitated a bit, but then Nishizawa (the youngest in the delegation) said, “We were afraid that comrade Stalin would scold us for the state of affairs in our party, but the situation forced us to come.” Stalin laughed and said with dissatisfaction, “Well, well. So I thought.  The Indian party has been undone (razvalili), and something’s happening with you, too.”  “I don’t know what’s happening in India, said Tokuda, but a group arguing against the leading line has formed inside the CC CPJ and it could split the party.”  Tokuda explained that they had come to Moscow to ask comrade Stalin to help them get a handle (razobrat’sia) on the situation.  To this Stalin replied, “We are not judges and will not decide whose position is correct and whose incorrect.  You, your party, should decide that yourselves.”

            It should be noted right away that after this statement by Stalin, the question of disagreements within the CC CPJ was neither touched on nor discussed further during the talks.

            Continuing the conversation, Stalin said, “But if you need our advice, then we can tell you how matters were decided in such cases in our party.”  As an example, he told how Lenin insisted on working out a concrete plan of action for the party and on that basis rallied (splachival) together those who agreed with him (edinomyshlenniki).  Maybe, advised Stalin, you too should create such a document taking into account the real situation in Japan.

            Tokuda said that this was a good idea and they would think about it now while in Moscow.

            The conversation’s atmosphere became warmer and more frank, especially since Stalin did not rebuke the guests in any way and carried on a conversation “among equals.”  The Japanese comrades liked this a lot.  Their tension at the beginning relaxed.  The beginning of the conversation was practically only between Stalin and Tokuda, but gradually the other members of the Japanese delegation were included.  Stalin wished the Japanese comrades success in their work on the documents.

            After the first meeting, the Japanese comrades, the threesome without Hakamada, worked on the programmatic document.

            At the second meeting, besides Molotov and Grigorian, Malenkov was also present.  By that time the CPJ leaders had drafted their program. It was translated into Russian and given to Stalin.

            At the beginning of the conversation Stalin said that he had read the document carefully and he had the impression that there was much of a general nature. It would be better to make it more concrete.  “And the title sounds like a newspaper headline – ‘On Revolution’.  You, better than anyone, know the real situation in the country, what worries the people and what tasks the party must put first.  Therefore, in form and content the document must be a program for immediate action,” recommended Stalin.

            Tokuda agreed with Stalin’s comments and said that at present the CPJ’s most important tasks were the struggle with the American occupation, already in its sixth year, and the struggle with the reactionary Japanese government that cooperates with the occupation, while defending monopoly interests and crushing the Japanese people.

            Then the Japanese comrades asked how similar questions were resolved in fraternal socialist countries.

            Malenkov got ahead of Stalin and said, “The war helped there and the Red Army…” Stalin sharply and rudely cut him off : “That’s unrelated! (k delu ne otnositsia).”  (It was clear to me that I need not translate this into Japanese.)

            Malenkov fidgeted (zaerzal) in his chair, shrunk (s’ezhilsia) and ashamedly looked at our guests.  There was a short, but very unpleasant pause.

             Answering the guests’ question in a completely calm tone, Stalin said that there was a completely different situation in European countries than in Japan and there all was resolved differently. 

            Continuing the conversation, Stalin noted that if the Japanese comrades considered the party’s main task to be the struggle against the American occupation, then it was necessary to express this in the program document.  It was necessary to create insufferable conditions for the occupiers everywhere, but for this it was necessary to think of creating a united front of patriotic forces.  Then he recommended to the Japanese comrades that they work a bit more on the draft.

            Between the second and third meetings Stalin, taking into consideration what had been written by the Japanese Communists, prepared a variant of the program document.  The translation of his [variant] was given to the guests for examination, and a copy of the Russian text was sent to the Ambassador of the PRC in Moscow, Wang Jiaxiang, who was invited to the third meeting with the translator Li Zhuli.

            During the third meeting’s discussion Wang Jiaxiang recommended changing the word “reform” to “revolution” in one of the points.  Molotov supported him, saying that in the proposed context, it [reform] had an “opportunistic tinge.”  Stalin agreed with the suggestion and said, “Yes, Wang Jiaxiang is right. It needs to be corrected.”

            The prepared draft was neither discussed point-by-point nor as a whole.

            Meanwhile, the Japanese comrades announced that they could not accept the document in its present form.  When Stalin asked “why?”  Tokuda replied that although everything in the document was correct, the language was so high-level (vysokokvalifitsirovannyi) and the style such, that “people might not believe that it is our work.”

            Then Stalin said: “If you agree with the document’s contents, then let it stand without any alterations. Words are less important than meaning.”  This meant that the Japanese comrades should present the material in their own language as they thought best. (This they did right in Moscow.)  At the end of the conversation, Stalin proposed informing Hakamada about the document and inviting him for concrete discussion at the final meeting.

            At the final meeting, Molotov and Grigorian were present on the Soviet side and for the Japanese, all four, [including] Hakamada for the first time.  Hakamada, however, sat separately from the others at the end of a rather long meeting table. 

            Turning to Hakamada, Stalin said, “Your comrades have worked out a draft program.  You’ve probably familiarized yourself with it?”  Hakamada replied that he had received and read the draft, but he hadn’t had time to “digest” it.  The other Japanese participants showed their dissatisfaction with his words with mocking, even caustic, comments aimed at Hakamada.  Stalin continued, “Well, during your reading did any disagreements in principle (printsipial’nye vozrazheniia) come up?”  Hakamada replied that for the moment he could not say anything specific, since this was a serious question requiring time to study. 

            Stalin began to explain that this document, as it was, defined the party’s main tasks for the near future and was calculated to strengthen party unity, without which [party] work would be impossible.  For the sake of this, it was necessary  to give up disagreements on secondary matters and personal affronts, if there were any.  Then Stalin said, “You are a worker, a metalworker. Is it possible that you are against the unity of your workers’ party?”

            Hakamada was noticeably upset and answered: “If comrade Stalin considers the draft correct, that is the highest and most convincing evaluation for me, and I swear (klianus’) that I will fight for the unity of the party and the fulfillment of the indicated goals.”

            Stalin was very satisfied with the conversation’s results.  The Japanese comrades immediately brightened up and, it seemed to me, made up.  They got up, shook hands all around and began to discuss their affairs.

            Observing this scene, Stalin said to Tokuda, “And nonetheless it’s bad to repudiate (otrekatsia) one’s party comrades.”  To which Tokuda replied, “I never repudiate real (nastoiashchikh) party comrades.”

            At the end of the meeting, Stalin suggested to the Japanese comrades, “In order to make this program into the program of the whole Japanese Communist party, it would be good to discuss this document at the CC plenum in Tokyo and in local party organizations. Only after that [should] it be definitively ratified.”

            The guests adopted this suggestion.

            At the end of the negotiations, Stalin gave a dinner in honor of the Japanese guests at which Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Grigorian, Wang Jiaxiang and several other comrades, who I didn’t know, were present.  Stalin made a toast to the guests, noting that Japanese politicians had always been wise and farsighted.  He wished the Japanese comrades success and health.  Then came toasts to Wang Jiaxiang, the Soviet comrades, and even “to the health of the translator.”  All this meant that Stalin was content with the overall results of the meetings with the CPJ leaders…

[“The Fateful Meeting at Kuntsevo,” in Hakamada Satomi, Watashi no sengoshi (My Postwar History), Asahi : Tokyo, 1978,  93-102. Translation from Japanese by David Wolff]

            After about four months in Moscow, August arrived and suddenly the Deputy Head of the Soviet party’s International Department (Kokusaibu) showed up at my lodgings.  He was a man I had never met before and he abruptly thrust a document at me.

            “Comrade Hakamada, I’d like you to tell me if you can approve of this or not,” he urged, and then said, “If you approve, we’ll go to Stalin’s place right from here.” 

            This high pressure approach was a sudden change from before.  The document he handed me would later become the “Program of 1951”[4] (“The Japanese Communist Party’s Present Demand is a New Program”)…

[A description of this program calling for immediate, violent revolution in Japan on the model of the Chinese revolution and Hakamada’s reasons for opposing it follows.]

What would happen if I rejected this “Program of 1951” to which even Stalin had put his pen?  At that time Stalin was the biggest being (sonzai) in the international Communist movement. He was the “great leader” and the “standard-bearer of peace.” I was deeply troubled.  I was angry at the Soviet party’s chauvinism (daikokushugi) in forcing me to [say] either yes (ies) or no (noo).  However, in the end, even if it wasn’t in my heart, I had no choice but to realize that I had to say “yes.” 

            Reluctantly I gave an approving answer and the Deputy Head said, “Let’s go to Stalin’s place immediately,” and rose from his seat.  It was already around nine in the evening.  Because Stalin was always awake until two or three in the morning, it still seemed like early evening.  Right away, we left [my] lodgings in a car.

            At that time Stalin was living in the western suburb of Kuntsevo ( [in] Moscow city’s Kuntsevo district), about fifteen kilometers away from the Kremlin.[5]  Although it was a “villa” (besso), aside from his Kremlin office, Stalin lived almost all his time [there].  If he had anything to say to government or party cadres, he had them called to the villa whether for a meeting or a meal.

            Nearby, the Moscow river flowed and dense forest spread out here and there.  Stalin’s villa was also in this quiet forest.  A wall encircled the premises and at key points uniformed soldiers mounted guard. 

            We arrived at almost the same moment as [JCP General Secretary] Tokuda [Kyuichi], Nozaka [Sanzo], and Nishizawa [Ryuji].  There were two layers of  entrance hall doors, the second opening only after the first closed, and both defended by the Ministry of State Security.  We were escorted into a living room with a big conference table in the very center, empty of all but a few other furnishings.  I noticed chandeliers hanging from the ceiling and thick rugs on the floor, but thought [the decoration] rather simple.   

            Stalin, Malenkov, Beria and Molotov were already there.  They were the Soviet Union’s highest party and governmental leaders at that time.  There is no need to say anything about Prime Minister and General Secretary Stalin.  Molotov was Deputy Prime Minister responsible for foreign affairs, Malenkov was both a Politburo and Secretariat member in order to control the party structures, and Beria, as Deputy Prime Minister controlled the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of State Security. As the eminence grise  (kuromaku = “black curtain”) behind the secret police, he was a terrifying being.

            I was excited and nervous at being able to meet Stalin.

            The representatives of the Soviet Union’s and Japan’s [Communist] parties shook hands all around and then they split up to sit facing each other across the table [see seating diagram on page 96].  On the Soviet side, at the furthest end was Stalin with Malenkov next to him, then Beria, then Molotov.  This clearly indicated that Malenkov was closest [to being] Stalin’s successor.  In comparison to Malenkov’s short, fat, honors-student type (yutosei taipu), Beria, wearing a pince-nez had something treacherous about him, and the senior figure, Molotov, made the most refined and mild impression.

            On the Japanese side, across from Stalin sat Tokuda with Nozaka next and Nishizawa following (Nozaka and Nishizawa’s order may have been reversed); then me. On my left sat the head of the Chinese [Communist] party’s International Department Wang Jiaxiang.  The interpreter [N. B. Adyrkhaev] sat between Stalin and Tokuda.

            “There were reasons for the Cominform’s criticism. I think it was correct,” said Stalin.

            He didn’t say anything about why this was correct. [He said it] as if he thought it surprising, but with a tranquil expression.  I arose and appealed to Stalin about the Tokuda group’s schismatic plot (bunretsu sakubo) following the Cominform’s criticism.

            “Comrade Tokuda is prone to violence (hageshiyasui).  In a fit of anger, he suddenly starts hitting the table, and therefore it is impossible to have cool-headed discussion within the Japanese party. Especially problematic was [Tokuda’s] selfish  behavior in pushing aside our duly elected Central Committee after the 6 June [1950] exile[6] caused by [General Douglas] MacArthur’s order. As a result, the Party lapsed into a split…”[7]

            At this point, Tokuda suddenly got up and angrily yelled, “You, what are you saying!”

            Without a moment’s delay, I became indignant and said, “Look. Since even in front of you, he has this  attitude, you can guess how he behaves at a Japanese [Communist party] Politburo meeting.”  Despite everything, I had related my differences of opinion with the Tokuda group.

            Then Nozaka censured [me]. “Hakamada, what on earth have you done this whole last year? You haven’t done anything, have you?”

            Molotov, sitting right in front of me with a firm expression, mutteringly replied to this statement, “Isn’t that because you didn’t give Hakamada any work to do?”  This was some kind of out-of-order statement and although it wasn’t translated, since I know Russian, I was able to understand his meaning.  Molotov was standing up (kabau) for me.

            Stalin remained silent, taking notes from one corner to the other of a piece of paper that lay in front of him.  I don’t know what he was writing.  When he spoke, he got up and while smoking his pipe, paced back and forth behind Malenkov and Beria. Slowly he said, “Comrade Hakamada, you [and your followers] have now created an opposition to the party center. This is no good.  Are you not a metal worker?  Therefore, I think you understand well enough that unless laborers unite, they cannot be victorious.  Can you expect victory by creating an opposition? We have cooperated to write this thesis (Program of 1951). On the basis of these guidelines, I want the Japanese party to advance (zenshin shitehoshii).” During his statement, for some reason Stalin thrice said, “Are you not a metal worker?” Before the war I had worked at a metal factory. No doubt he was referring to that.

            There was a lot I wanted to say about the “Program of 1951,” but to rehash the argument after saying “yes” to the Deputy Head of the Party’s International Department was impossible.  I was upset and wanted to light a cigarette, but Wang Jiaxiang, sitting next me, pinned my arm down in a flurry.  “Don’t smoke in front of Stalin,” he said. I took a look and saw that there was an ashtray in front of Stalin, but not in front of anyone else.  I had no choice but to put my cigarettes back in my pocket.

            The meeting at Stalin’s Kuntsevo villa in the Moscow suburbs went late into the night. Because it [started] after dinner, there was neither food nor liquor. Once or twice, male servants brought tea in distinctively Russian tall glasses.  The forest surrounding the villa was as quiet as death.

            In the main (moppara), Stalin talked. Pacing, slowly punctuating each word, he talked.  His expression, however, was calm, definitely permitting no compromises. 

            “We cooperated to make this thesis (Program of 1951),” he said.  His next words shocked me.  “Comrade Hakamada, according to the Japanese comrades there is a sharp fractional conflict taking place in Japan.  This is no good.  This must stop immediately.  I want the guidelines (Program of 1951) we have now agreed on to unite the party.  To this end, we need Comrade Hakamada’s self-critique (jiko hihansho). I think it best that you write it now and send it to the Japanese comrades.”

            Sitting at Stalin’s side, Malenkov, Beria and Molotov looked hard at me.  Tokuda Kyuichi, Nozaka Sanzo and Nishizawa Ryuji looked at me as if to say, “Write it, of course.”  At that moment what choice was there but to say “yes.”

            Even now [1978] there are insincere flatterers (keihakusha) among the party cadres who say I backed down despondently when Stalin gave “a roar.” (“ikkatsu”)  That [talk of] “a roar” contradicts the facts is not even necessary to say.  Such comments also [show] ignorance of the situation at that time.  So I repeat: Stalin’s grandeur (idaisa) was absolute for us Communists.  You couldn’t deny the facts of the Russian revolution’s victory despite capitalist intervention and the building of a socialist Soviet Union…

[Hakamada then describes the morally painful process of writing a self-critique.]

The meeting with Stalin probably ended a little after eleven.  Although it seemed short, it also felt like it had lasted a long time.  The International Department’s Head, Wang Jiaxiang, representing the Chinese party, didn’t say anything.  At our departure, Stalin turned to me. “Comrade Hakamada, I hear you are in poor health.  How about fully recuperating in the Soviet Union?”

            After the meeting, Tokuda, Nozaka, Nishizawa and Wang Jiaxiang immediately left for Beijing. It seemed they had come to get approval of military guidelines worked out in China.  I heard that on leaving the Tokuda group told the Soviet party, whether seriously or in jest I don’t know,  “Hakamada is divisive, so please send him to Siberia or somewhere.” Hearing this afterwards, I  resented  their lack of comradely sentiment. 

[After examination by Kremlin doctors, Hakamada was sent to Crimea to recuperate.  He would next see Stalin displayed on a funeral bier in March 1953.]