You know that this counterrevolutionary group snatched from our ranks a favorite, a tribune, a party leader, com. Kirov. To accomplish this villainous act, they recruited forces of the < … > defeated, yet active Zinovievite factional, anti-party, anti-Soviet counterrevolutionary group. In order to conduct their active struggle against our proletarian state, this counterrevolutionary group linked itself with representatives of bourgeois countries to struggle against Soviet power.

This document clearly shows what those who chose the road of struggle against the party are capable of. It shows where the logic of factional struggle leads.

Comrades, it was only days ago that we discussed the case of a former member of our organization, the counterrevolutionary Safarov.

We unanimously decided to expel him [from the party]. We unanimously decided to approve the measures that the organs of the proletarian dictatorship are taking against Safarov and other counterrevolutionaries.

Com. Manuilsky in his report about counterrevolutionary group activities

Refers to D. Manuilsky's speech “About the Counterrevolutionary Group of the Zinovievite-Trotskyist Bloc,” delivered on 23 December 1934 at the closed meeting of the ECCI party organization.

called for [strengthening] our militant Bolshevik Party vigilance. It was especially necessary since Safarov, a liar and a counterrevolutionary, spent year after year in the ranks of our organization, and we proved incapable of unmasking this counterrevolutionary until he was arrested. Naturally, this appeal by com. Manuilsky found a due response, could not but find a due response in the heart of every party and Komsomol member. Thus, the party group of the Eastern Secretariat,

The Eastern Secretariat of the ECCI was created in 1920. In 1921–1922 it was called the Far Eastern Department; in 1923–1926, the Eastern Department; and after 1927, the Eastern Secretariat. In the fall of 1935 it was renamed the Secretariat of O. Kuusinen.

following com. Manuilsky's appeal, raised once again at its meeting the question of how it was possible that Safarov, after working with the same people for several years, could not have been exposed by those people. And this party group failed to find the right answer, which is that the party group displayed insufficient party vigilance.

In addition to that, the party group examined the Magyar question. And now, as com. Chernomordik has announced, the Magyar question is on today's agenda. I will examine in detail why it is that today the party committee raises the Magyar question.

You know Magyar. But we have not known him well enough; we knew him badly. And that superficial knowledge prevented us from fully and completely understanding Magyar as a party member, as a Bolshevik. Today we can state, firmly and resolutely, that Magyar was not a Bolshevik, not a real Communist, not a Communist [at all].

What are the facts? First, Magyar's connection with Zinoviev, Safarov , Gorshenin. The names of these people are familiar to you: they are on the list, they are mentioned in the resolution adopted by the organs of the proletarian dictatorship [NKVD]. These people have been exiled as counterrevolutionary elements. Until recently, Magyar maintained ties with Zinoviev. I repeat, Magyar maintained ties with Zinoviev until the last moment. Their meetings took place when Zinoviev worked on the board of “Bolshevik.”

Bolshevik—a theoretical and political journal of the CC VKP(b) published from 1924 to 1952, when it was renamed Kommunist. G. Zinoviev was on its editorial board from 1933 until his arrest on 16 December 1934.

They continued to meet after Zinoviev was kicked off that board. They were meeting even after com. Kirov was killed.

Where did those meetings take place? They took place in the editorial office or in the street. As it happens, these former comrades in arms in the struggle against the party, against the leadership, against com. Stalin, found a time and place to meet. They met despite com. Pyatnitsky's repeated categorical warnings to Magyar against maintaining connections or meeting with Zinoviev. These warnings notwithstanding, Magyar continued to meet with Zinoviev, this miscreant, factionalist wrecker. His counterrevolutionary activities are well known to the party and the working class of not only our country. In his capacity as a Comintern official, Magyar had no practical need to see Zinoviev. Their meetings could not but bring about certain harm.

What brought them together? What brought Magyar together with Zinoviev? At the meeting of the party group of the Eastern L[ender] S[ecretariat] and at the party committee [meeting], Magyar claimed that during his meetings with Zinoviev, he discussed politics only, that he could not discuss other issues. In Zinoviev, Magyar discovered a consultant on the questions of international politics, on the questions of theory. “Consultant” Zinoviev discovered a patient who struggled with him against the party for many years. And if Magyar was capable of really breaking [with Zinoviev] ideologically and organizationally, if he could overcome and understand the essence of this Zinoviev, he would have never joined him.

From this flows the conclusion that Magyar shared common ideological conceptions with Zinoviev. Magyar returned to the VKP(b) having not completely abandoned his factionalist ideas. Magyar still remained a Zinovievite; the residue of factionalist ideas remained deeply implanted in his consciousness. There is no other way to explain it. I repeat, the fact that Magyar and Zinoviev were former active factionalists served as a prerequisite for their meetings, drew Magyar into receiving consultations from Zinoviev. Magyar's repeated meetings with Zinoviev did nothing to help the party to expose the [real] person [and] the double-dealing and treachery of Zinoviev. He signaled nothing to the party. Magyar and Safarov are two inseparable, closely knit links of the common struggle against the party. Magyar and Zinoviev. The Safarov group—Magyar, Safarov, < … >, Vardin. It survived as a group and continued to struggle against the party even after the Fifteenth Congress.

The Fifteenth VKP Congress, which took place on 2–19 December 1927, declared “belonging to the Trotskyist opposition and propagandizing its views incompatible with membership in the Bolshevik Party.” The congress expelled seventy-five leading members of the Trotskyist-Zinovievite bloc from the VKP.

However, when Magyar was asked at the party meeting of our group, why this Safarov-Magyar-Vardin group made its statement later than Zinoviev's group. Magyar asserted that, in contrast with Zinoviev's group, this group had no plans to conduct an anti-party struggle, but rather to return to the party honestly and with no [intention of] double-dealing. Having been out of the party's ranks after the Fifteenth Congress, they considered it honest to continue the struggle against the party. This group defies the [party] leadership [bezvozhdentsy].

Bezvozhdentsy—refers to a group of left oppositionists in the VKP(b). It was formed in late 1927 by former supporters of Zinoviev who were dissatisfied with his rupture with Trotsky on the eve of the Fifteenth Party Congress. By 1930 this group had ceased to exist.

(KNORIN: [A group] of which Rumiantsev was a part.)

Comrades, what does Magyar think about this active factional struggle against the party? They “honestly” remained out of the party ranks and against the party, and only in the late summer of 1928 did they again fraudulently sneak into our party. Year after year they “honestly” remained in the ranks of our party and continued their double-dealing. And now we see the names of these “honest” people in the indictment, referred to as counterrevolutionaries.

We see how they are sent by the organs of the proletarian dictatorship into administrative exile and how this “honest” Safarov, this “honest” Vardin, and this “honest” Magyar continue their ties with Zinoviev. Damn this honesty. There is no place in our Bolshevik Communist Party for such “honesty.” It is a pity, comrades, that they have been able to deceive our party for a long time. Such “honesty” dulled Magyar, destroyed his Bolshevik flair, and upon receiving from Zinoviev the charge [to engage in] factionalist struggle, his old background took over.

They arrested Safarov. Magyar is the first to learn about this arrest. And again it so happens that Safarov's maid rushes to Magyar to inform him first. Why Magyar? Again, their connection can provide the answer to this question, their connection in the enduring struggle against the party. Safarov, the counterrevolutionary, is taken to Leningrad. Magyar provides material support to Safarov through that very housemaid. Why Magyar? Why would Magyar display philanthropic sentiment toward a person arrested for his counter-revolutionary activities by the organs of proletarian dictatorship? This fact cannot be considered as anything other than an anti-party, anti-Soviet action by Magyar.

The Comintern party organization meeting is held. Well, not only in the Comintern; throughout our country party meetings are taking place and are actively reacting to the counterrevolutionary activities of this counterrevolutionary group. Magyar remains silent. You remember the big [December] meeting in MAI

Abbreviation of Mezhdunarodny Agrarny Institut, the International Agrarian Institute, created in January 1925 under the auspices of the Krestintern (Peasants' International). It studied agrarian and peasant questions in different countries. MAI was dissolved in 1940.

when the assembly room could not seat all the comrades eager to take an active part, eager to express their indignation about the counterrevolutionary activities of Safarov and other members of the counterrevolutionary group.

Magyar stayed out of this activity. Magyar cut himself off. Magyar claims he did not know about it. But it is hard to believe, comrades. It does not turn out that way. From the moment this meeting was announced, I and many other party committee members were literally besieged by our comrades who had not been transferred to the VKP(b). They demanded to be allowed to be present at this meeting. News about this meeting spread at lightning speed. Comrades from MAI and other places wanted to be present at this meeting. Magyar, a worker in our apparatus, did not know about it for some reason.

Next, feeling the weight of a number of anti-party, anti-Soviet actions (he could not but feel it), Magyar remained silent, he did not attend the party meeting, he did not raise a question to discuss. Only when the [party] group of the Eastern Secretariat raised the question, pulled Magyar out, made Magyar speak and respond, only then did he start to talk about his conduct. I must say that neither at the party group [meeting] nor at the session of the party committee did Magyar give a political evaluation of his actions. And now Magyar is surprised at the party group and the party committee meeting [and wonders] why the party group and the party committee consider his political explanation of his ties to Zinoviev and others totally unsatisfactory. It is very simple. He failed to tell the party committee and the party group about everything that tied him, united him with and attracted him to Zinoviev and other counterrevolutionary elements. Magyar tried and still tries to hide behind a formal explanation that they supposedly deceived him, that Magyar was some sort of dummy incapable of understanding the actions and politics of this counterrevolutionary group. Since when has Magyar become such a dummy? The party organization knows Magyar as a politically educated, trained, mature person. And yet today he is trying to present himself to the party organization in a different light.

This will not work. We do not need such an evaluation, such a political revelation. We need a real political evaluation of those facts and actions that Magyar has committed of late. Magyar has not given us an answer as to why he was connected with Zinoviev, why he turned to Zinoviev for consultations, why Magyar was so attentive to providing material support to Safarov, why Magyar was silent until lately, why Magyar failed to help the party to expose the people with whom he, Magyar, was closely connected. For all that, he could feel and understand those people's attitudes better. Magyar does not give any answer to these questions.

It seems that Magyar wants to hide behind this formal answer, to elude, to pretend that he has been an honest member of our Bolshevik Party. This time it will not work. The party organization, the party group, and the party committee have decided to expel Magyar from the party for all his actions.

Magyar is trying to cast suspicion over, to slander, the organs of the proletarian dictatorship. He declared at the meeting that the organs of the [proletarian] dictatorship arrest in bunches and investigate later. No, comrades. The organs of the proletarian dictatorship arrest when they possess enough material and have evaluated those people who deserve to be removed by the iron hand of the proletarian dictatorship from the ranks of the working class and our party, those people who hinder our successful socialist construction, who obstruct overcoming difficulties, who attempt to strike a counterrevolutionary blow in the back of the proletarian state, who plot against the leaders of the party and the working class of our country. That is why Magyar slanders the organs of the proletarian dictatorship.

Magyar declared at the meeting of the party group and at the party committee meeting: “Whatever is being told to you, you will not believe anyway; you will pervert everything.” No, comrades, the party organization has no interest in perverting the facts, does not want to and cannot do so. The party organization wants to look into these facts and evaluate them properly.

This is a distrust of the party organization, this desire to cast suspicion over the decisions and materials and then to twist these materials to extricate oneself. However, the party organization possesses a number of specific facts that I have cited. One cannot avoid them, and Magyar, as a former member of our party organization, must respond about them before the party organization.

Comrades, I want to finish my report on Magyar with the following. For the second time our party organization is discussing the actions of our members. We are placing before our audience a second member. The first was [exposed] with the help of the organs of proletarian dictatorship, and the second is being discussed today by the party organization itself. This fact points to the necessity to improve our party vigilance even more, to once again examine and penetrate deeper into our party ranks. We should implement in practice, in deeds, the appeal of com. Manuilsky to the party organization. We should raise our party vigilance, our party work in the common struggle against the smallest manifestation of political indifference and other elements of liberalism toward enemies of the working class.

Comrades, we have to organize more tightly, more strongly, the ranks of our party organization, to rally around the Central Committee of our party, around our beloved leader, great com. Stalin. (Applause.)

CHERNOMORDIK: The floor belongs to com. Magyar.

MAGYAR: Comrades, if I were not standing here but sitting there among you and if I had to vote on such an issue, on the issue of the party membership of a comrade, of a former comrade (I do not know which to consider myself), who is being accused of such crimes against the party, against the working class, against the revolution, against our Soviet country, I, comrades, maybe with a heavy heart but with no hesitation and firmly, would vote for the expulsion of such a comrade, or a former comrade, from the party. But, comrades, when I am speaking before you, I do not plan to defend myself or to deliver a speech in my defense. So, if I argue against some formulations of com. Kotelnikov, it is not over the political essence of the question but over secondary issues, over some practical issues, and later over the most important question, which I will address later.

What do I admit before the party organization? The facts that I am going to admit before you, each of those facts, maybe one-tenth or one-hundredth part of those facts, is quite sufficient to expel me from the party. What are these facts?

The first fact: in 1925–26, when in the USSR, I was an active member of the Zinovievite opposition. When the party sent me to China, I was unable to actively participate in the opposition's activities anymore, but I did not disarm myself before the party, did not recognize my mistakes, and continued to maintain connections with the Zinovievite group. I shared with the Zinovievite group views on a number of vital questions of our policy. It was not today, comrades, that I understood that the Zinovievite opposition was an anti-Soviet, anti-party, Menshevik,

Mensheviks—originally the moderate wing of the RSDRP; it became an autonomous group with the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (RSDRP) after the Second Party Congress in 1903. After 1912 it was an independent party, though retaining the RSDRP name. It existed legally in Russia until 1922.

counterrevolutionary opposition within our party: I understood it earlier and declared it to the party. As to a factual remark that does not justify me, but rather aggravates my situation: com. Kotelnikov is not quite correct when he says that I returned to the party. I was not expelled from the party; the party was extremely lenient toward me. I received an extremely mild party reprimand for my active participation in the Zinovievite, anti-Soviet, anti-party counterrevolutionary group.

Well, comrades, you know what the Zinovievite opposition turned into. People who participate in politics and whom the party entrusts with such work as the party entrusted to me have no right to seek out, to beg for, to demand leniency for, committing such major political mistakes. If I failed to understand the nature of the Zinovievite opposition then, it is quite clear now what this Zinovievite opposition actually was. This fact alone is sufficient to expel me from the party.

Second fact: after the Fifteenth Congress, I returned to the USSR. I broke with the Zinovievite opposition. [But] I did not come over to the party's position. I was a member of the so-called Safarov-Vardin-Magyar group, if you like.

(KNORIN: The one Rumiantsev was a member of?)

No, worse. As a matter of factual reference: the one Kotolynov was in.

Again, comrades, as a matter of reference, I did not defend the Safarov group before either the party group or the party committee [meeting]. I do not know why comrades insist that I wanted to portray our group as an honest one. I repeat, the Safarov group was as anti-party, anti-Soviet, [and] counterrevolutionary as the Zinovievites, as the Trotskyists.

We broke with Zinoviev not because we wanted to lay down arms before the party. We broke with Zinoviev because he capitulated to the party. We knew that this capitulation was a false one, that he deceived the party. Maybe it would be absurd to say that we were more honest than Zinoviev, that we did not deceive the party while remaining as a group. It could be absurd, but, comrades, let us not pick on specific words.

The Safarov group was an anti-Soviet group, which defied the leadership, an anti-Soviet, anti-party counterrevolutionary group, if you like. Besides that, this group had another quality: it was ridiculous, worthless, it was a wretched group. So, what kind of a “group” was ours? This is the second point.

Third point. In politics, one has to judge people, especially people participating in the workers' movement, not by their intentions but by the results. People must be judged by their deeds, not by their words. I think I must tell you directly that when I participated in the Zinovievite opposition, when I participated in this antileadership group, I did not realize what this could lead to. I did not realize it then. But the point is not this; the point is that in politics one has to judge not by intentions but by results. I referred to the results when I said to the party group and to the party committee that I profoundly felt my political responsibility for having planted at some time seeds that gave fascist shoots, responsibility for the fact that from these kinds of groups emerged bandits who killed a member of the Politburo of our party, com. Kirov. This is what we are responsible for—to a degree to be determined by the party and the organs of Soviet power.

(KNORIN: Not just for this.)

I will say now — a full political responsibility. For this, it is quite clear, I also deserve to be expelled from the party.

Fourth point. In June 1928, I appealed to the party claiming to have recognized my mistakes and to have embraced the correct Leninist policy of the Central Committee. However, I retained personal connections with Zinoviev, Safarov, Vardin, plus some others, had meetings with them, held talks and conversations with them.

(VOICE: Who else?)

I have named them, and, if necessary, I will name them [again]. After that I appealed [to the party], claiming to have recognized my mistakes throughout the whole period — precisely at the time when I met with them most frequently, in the period when I maintained a personal friendship with Safarov. Moreover, when it turned out that we worked together in the same collective in the Comintern, I expended considerable effort to retain Safarov, to the extent possible, in this collective.

Speaking about my personal connections with these people, I would like to say, comrades, that com. Kotelnikov was right when he said that once there were meetings, once conversations took place, they were of an exclusively political character. We discussed political issues only, and I failed to discern in these conversations, during these meetings, the real attitude of these people. I did not recognize it.

I know, comrades, that you do not believe this statement.

(Noise.)

I know it. Yet, I would ask the comrades not to interrupt me, if possible.

(VOICE: You are asking for too much.)

I characterized this fact to the party group and to the party committee, that I consider myself a worthless party member, a person who, from the party's point of view, can be characterized as “some fool [who is] more dangerous than the enemy.”

(Knorin: Cheap!)

(Laughter.)

(Knorin: Very smart!)

For this, comrades, I deserve to be expelled from the party.

Fifth point: after Safarov's arrest, I received the maid whom Safarov had sent to me with the news about his arrest. Here I have to give a factual reference that com. Kotelnikov did not provide. This took place on the evening of 18 December, and on the morning of 19 December my first trip was to the party organization, where I informed com. Kotelnikov and com. Mif about this, asking them to further inform the leaders of our collective. Therefore, I did not conceal this fact.

Next. I gave this maid money so that she could go to Leningrad for a meeting and to give [a package to Safarov], since she informed me that Safarov had been transferred to Leningrad. After I did it, I immediately informed the party organization about this act. Similarly, I have never concealed that Safarov's wife, upon her arrival, visited me and talked with me. I am not going to confuse [this] general meeting with detailed descriptions of those relatively unimportant conversations. I say “relatively” because I immediately told everything to com. Kotelnikov and com. Mif and told it to you in detail before the party group and the party committee.

How did I assess this fact and how do I assess it now? This fact revealed that I am still very much the petit bourgeois, that I have a lot of blue-blooded individualism, that I set my opinions, my judgments, against the opinion of the party and the judgments of our authorities, that my conduct was anti-Soviet, anti-party. Well, I committed this anti-party, anti-Soviet action under the conditions that I have explained. For this action I also deserve to be expelled from the party.

I stress that I understand very clearly that each of these actions of mine, separate parts of these actions, is quite sufficient to expel me from the party.

What, comrades, do I not admit? There are, comrades, some specific minor issues, and there is also one question, a most crucial one. Regarding the meeting: I did not attend it. I do not know, comrades, whether I should dwell on this fact in great detail. I did not receive any information about the meeting. I did not know [about it]. I did not know that the meeting would take place and, therefore, I did not attend it.

The second fact, that I cast aspersions on the organs of the proletarian dictatorship: I do not admit it. I do not admit casting aspersions on the organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat. I do not know how comrades there understood me and how my words were written down. The meaning [of my words], my idea, was the following. After it was revealed that members of the former Zinovievite opposition, these fascist scoundrels, killed com. Kirov, I personally considered that it would have been logical to arrest us all and later to examine who is culpable and to what degree. I still think so.

I am very much afraid that you might take this [simply] as big words, empty phrases, but quite sincerely I would consider it fair if my case was also investigated there. They can investigate well, they investigate effectively. This case has to be investigated well and effectively.

Next, comrades, as I have already mentioned, I did not admit to the party group that I tried to portray the Safarov group, the group that defies the leadership, as something better than the Zinovievite, Trotskyist, and other anti-party groups.

(VOICE: Did you want to portray it as an honest group?)

Permit me to explain. Comrades, including com. Kotelnikov in his speech here today, accused me of not displaying any form of initiative, of not expressing my attitude toward this question. Well, comrades, I was in such a position that it was impossible to do the right thing in general. I thought and I think now that if I showed initiative, it would look like an attempt to extricate myself; everyone would have thought that “he's given the game away,” but the situation turned out to be …

(Fainberg;

I. I. Fainberg. He and his wife, Eta Rubinovna Fainberg, worked in the ECCI apparatus.

Is there anything to discuss here?]

The situation was such … Comrades, I will not answer heckling comments. The situation was such that it was impossible to trust our words, the words of the former Zinovievite opposition. Prattling before you, before the party—no one can believe us now. Declarations? Delivering speeches? You know, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Safarov, and others wrote articles, spoke from the rostrum at the Congress, were published, gave talks — and here is the result.

(Knorin: There are some who are trusted.)

Now, comrades, I do not admit to the most essential and important point. This is the most essential and important point — whether or not I was a member of the group after 1928, when I came back to the party line. No, I was not a member [of the group]. I do not admit it. Did I deceive the party by coming and saying that I am with the party, that I consider the party line correct, and later affiliated, organizationally or ideologically in any other form, with another anti-party group? Comrades, I do not admit it. I did not belong to any group or grouping, I did not retain a wall between me and the party. This I cannot admit. I do not admit, comrades, that I knew that those people with whom I belonged to the same faction were preparing weapons, were at any time planning a crime against the party. Comrades, I do not speak about the terrorist group. I speak about the political group which the terrorist group grew out of. I do not admit it.

What political lessons did I draw for myself? Comrades, since I reembraced the party line, I have been trying to conduct the party line to the best of my ability. I have struggled against Trotskyism, I have struggled against the ideology of the Zinovievite-Trotskyist opposition. But at the same time, I have maintained a liberal-blue-blood friendship with members of the former anti-Soviet groups and, as it is clear today, anti-Soviet, anti-party groups that continued to exist. I combined work according to the party line with personal relationships with people who were enemies of Soviet power.

Another lesson. Comrades, I knew Zinoviev and what Zinoviev was worth better than anybody else, and, nevertheless, I continued maintaining personal relations with him.

Comrades, I realized earlier that groups, factions, blocs, and plots against the party led to the opposite side of the barricades. I realized this after I reembraced the party line. But what I failed to understand, comrades, was that in the present situation, the struggle against the party, against the policy of the party's Central Committee, the class struggle in general in our country was taking on new forms, adopting new methods, new forms and new methods that, in the final analysis, led to terror. These new forms, these new methods of struggle against the country, against the government, against the party — this is what I did not understand. And it led those people who dragged me, along with themselves, into the dirt, into shame and disgrace before the party and the working class.

Another lesson for me: I understood the correctness of party policy, the policy of the Central Committee, but I tolerated liberal gossip. I myself driveled. I tolerated expressions of agreement with the party line conveyed in a tone that should have indicated to me that there was no [actual] agreement, that [in fact] there was a struggle against the party policy. This, comrades, is important not only for me personally. I realized once again …

(At this moment com. Martynov approaches the Presidium, talks to the Presidium, and smiles.)

Comrades, no laughing at civil funerals.

(Knorin: Such a mean speech deserves to be laughed at.)

I will not respond to com. Knorin.

(VOICE: He conducts propaganda in the form of political speech and yet wants us to listen to him!)

I am finishing. I declare once again to this party organization: although these facts are insignificant because they are connected to me … My whole behavior again revealed my petit bourgeois individualism my blue-blooded individualism, which I brought with me from that social milieu from which I came. During the first purge that I went through after being exchanged, comrades, members of the purge commission warned me about it. That proved to be insufficient for me, and I did not learn the lesson. You remember my last purge, when c. Solts again pointed this out. Again, I did not learn the lesson and did not realize, did not overcome, these mistakes of mine.

Another lesson: for a long time I have been on sort of bureaucratic work. I did conduct mass work all the time, but for the most part my work was sort of bureaucratic. I did not work on the ground. I think, comrades, that this is not related to me directly; this is already out of the question in my regard. This question is to be discussed with regards to people of the same social origin as mine, to people coming from the same social environment as I do. They should not stay in bureaucratic work for a long time, comrades. I am finishing.

Comrades, I am finishing and making the following conclusion regarding those actions that I have admitted.

(VOICE FROM THE HALL: And where are those people? Who are you referring to? Which people are of the same origins as you? Who are you addressing?)

I am of petit bourgeois origin …

(KOTELNIKOV: The comrades are asking, If [they] are not to be in bureaucratic work, then where ought they to be?)

I am not talking about myself. What I mean is that if they have been in bureaucratic work for a while, they should be sent to lower-level work again, so that they do not stay too long in bureaucratic work. That is no good, either.

Permit me to make a conclusion. I think that for those actions that I have admitted to, I deserve being expelled from the party.

(VOICE: For the work in the past?)

No.

(MARTYNOV: The past is waiting after 1928?)

No. I never said anything like that, and please do not attribute it to me. I have declared that I did maintain, even after 1928, personal connections with Zinoviev. Haven't I told you that until the last days it was friendship that I maintained with Safarov, until the last days? Actions that I committed after Safarov's arrest, were they in 1928? I have clearly indicated to you the five points that constitute my guilt before the party organization.

(MIF: But did you plant anti-party seeds only before 1928, or before 1928 and since then, too?)

I have declared …

(MIF: And what you have been declaring here, aren't these the anti-party declarations?)

(VOICE: We want you to tell [us].)

This party organization will judge. However, I declare that I have been working in this organization for six years. You have to prove where in my works I did it. I worked on issues concerning twenty-two parties in the Comintern. Where did I plant seeds? Comrades, you have to prove [that I did] it since I reembraced the party line. Who is capable of proving it?

Let me finish. I deserve to be expelled from the party. However, I declare [this]: since I declared my agreement with the party's policy, I have not consciously deceived the party.

BÉLA KUN: Magyar, our former comrade, as he, I believe, called himself, declared here with rhetorical bombast: “No laughing at civil funerals.” It is true, of course, as well as that at civil funerals they deliver graveside orations, not a lawyer's speech.

I do not really know what Magyar was talking about today. To be precise, what did he admit in his speech? He recognized that he deserves to be expelled from the party. I was sitting in the back and did not hear well enough, but I understood that after he started his graveside oration and mentioned civil funerals, he continued on as a lawyer would.

I must say that if, in the near future, I confront a class enemy, stand before the court of a class enemy, I will construct my speech the same way Magyar did here before this clearly hostile audience, before this organization [which is] obviously hostile to him.

I, comrades, am not going to look into particular details. I think that the party organization learned the factual side of this case at the party committee and party group meetings well enough. I would like to dwell a while on characterizing the roots of this group's counterrevolutionary activity, or, it would be better to say, not of the group itself but of Magyar in particular.

I think that Magyar did not really mean that he turned out to be just a fool. Magyar is no fool. Magyar is a clever person. Magyar is an educated person. Magyar is a well-read person. Magyar knows his way around international politics, his way around inner-party life, and so on and so forth.

If he did not assume that he is totally untrustworthy, if he did not assume that one cannot believe their promises, even if they are telling the truth, he would then, obviously, describe differently the sources of that shameful activity that was reflected in his latest actions, reflected in the fact that, after the murder of com. Kirov, after the murder of one of the best leaders of the best sections of the Comintern, he supported the obvious counterrevolutionary Safarov.

He did not want to, but he had to prove sociologically, referring to his social origin, that his evolution was, so to say, historically justified. Naturally, his evolution was rather complex, and clearly, under those conditions in which he worked and grew in the party, it was inevitable and natural that he came to the road of political degeneration, to that political swamp that soaked up the scoundrels of the Zinovievite counterrevolutionary group. By that swamp there stood a guard, a protector of the interests of international capitalism, an ingenious protector of the interests of international capitalism, a representative of a capitalist, probably fascist state. I think it is no accident that Magyar, being liberated by the Soviet state, by the Soviet Union, from the prison of Horthy,

Miklos Horthy de Nagybanyai (1868–1957). An admiral, he was the leader of Hungary from 1920 to 1944. In 1919 he led the crushing of the Hungarian revolutionary movement. In October 1944, he was interned by the Germans. After 1949 he lived in Portugal.

the hangman of Hungarian proletariat, found himself in the camp of enemies of the Soviet Union.

I do not want to say that I foresaw it. On the contrary, I must say that I did not foresee it, and during the purge, when I defended com. Magyar, them …

(MANIS: Yes, yes, we remember.)

… I then tried to explain it in such a way that he, as an intellectual, was acting according to the motto To be on the side of the weak in the presence of the strong. But, comrades, such a psychological approach was wrong. It is possible that I could not see through Magyar. I repeat, Magyar was considered a learned man, a specialist on issues of international politics, international economics, a person who read a lot. He was considered a Marxist. And it turns out that the more he read, the more harmful to the party he became. What kind of Marxism is it if it is harmful to the party? Probably someone would say that Magyar wrote many articles. He himself said, Let them prove where in my writings, in my work, I planted anti-party seeds. What kind of lesson should we learn from this? That we can write whatever we like and do whatever we like. However, one can write one thing and do the other.

This is the first lesson we should learn. Our vigilance should not be aimed at what is being written, as usually happens. Our vigilance should be aimed, first of all, at what is being done. This is exactly what com. Stalin has said and written, that one has to test the Social Democratic leaders of the Second International not by their words, not by their writings, but by their deeds. It refers to this case as well. Then, of course, we will never fail to foresee the further evolution of such people who write one thing and do the other.

In his speech Magyar said that he worked and wrote and that one can examine his work and what he wrote. This reminds me of the methods of Zinoviev's leadership in the Comintern. If you permit me, I would like to dwell on this in a little more detail. Zinoviev, as an anti-Soviet element, as a counterrevolutionary, has now been completely exposed. However, there are some very compelling political reasons to look into the question of Zinovievite methods of leadership in the Comintern.

What characterized the Zinovievite methods of leadership? Only a few know about it. Those who occupied positions of leadership in the Comintern at the time of Zinoviev, those who have to carry out the work of exposing completely the Zinovievite methods, have taken a sort of monopoly position on this issue. Zinoviev always had two pockets and two perspectives

Refers to a thesis proclaimed by Zinoviev at the Sixth Enlarged ECCI Plenum which read that the Comintern should be ready for the outbreak of the world revolution in the coming three to five years, as well as for its delay until some undefined time.

. This is the main method of the Zinovievite leadership:to have two pockets and in each pocket to have one perspective. And, depending on what is to be emphasized, pulling out this or that perspective. This is what is called the Zinovievite leadership.

However, comrades, this was connected with another major method of leadership by Zinoviev. He repeatedly made statements about implementing the Leninist line in the Comintern himself or being Lenin's deputy in the Comintern.

Zinoviev always had two pockets and two perspectives;however, he always had one policy toward the Comintern's cadres. Of course, he did not manage to deceive the Comintern's cadres, the cadres of Communist Parties. Many of us remember how, at the time when the implementation of the United Front tactics began, Zinoviev supported these tactics before Lenin and [at the same time] tried to persuade us to speak up against the United Front tactics at the preliminary meeting.

This kind of unscrupulousness, comrades, was the basic tone of today's speech by Magyar. I wrote everything correctly, I behaved properly, and yet I deserve to be expelled. How can one understand it? Isn't it the final stage of political degeneration? Isn't it an attempt, a new attempt, to hide behind the expulsion and leave the back door [open] in order to come back to the party at a time when vigilance is lower than it is now? This is the eal ideological connection with Zinoviev and those methods that Zinoviev employed in the Communist International. Comrades, vigilance alone, decisions alone, are insufficient to [struggle] against these methods. We have to expose completely the Zinovievite methods of leadership and to oppose them with the new, truly Bolshevik methods of leadership that are being employed in the Comintern with more and more success since Zinoviev's removal. Probably we still have shortcomings. But I have to say that the quality of the Comintern's leadership is now higher, much higher, than it was under Zinoviev. If we look back, [we see nothing] but the policy of two pockets and two perspectives that surfaced, for example, when Zinoviev, at the time of the Anglo-Soviet Committee, declared that the route of the revolution had been changed, [that] we are going toward the revolution on the oad of the British trade unions. But then, six months later, [he] accused the party of opportunism because it created the Anglo-Soviet Committee. Besides that, an important method of Zinovievite leadership was dilettantism, despite the fact that many [people] wanted to create a picture of Zinoviev as a superhuman, a great leader who guided the Comintern at a very high level. I think that we do not have to be ashamed of our leadership. On the contrary, the quality of our leaders, of our leadership, is higher than ever. We now have to rally around this Comintern leadership and, under the direction of these leaders, weed out the oots, eliminate all of the emnants of Zinovievite methods. Then, I think, we will be able to foresee such developments as Magyar has gone through, toward that swamp where there are undoubtedly still scoundrels of the Zinovievite anti-Soviet group. To drain this swamp, [the support of] the power of the Soviet and international proletariat under the leadership of our great leader, com. Stalin [will] surely [be needed]. I, comrades, vote for expelling Magyar.

(Applause.)

CHERNOMORDIK:A suggestion has been received to fix the time limit to ten minutes. (Accepted.)…

HECKERT: The last weeks have shown that our class vigilance is not as up to the mark as the situation requires. Therefore, we must be more alert than ever to each word said by our comrades. Magyar said here that the group to which he belonged intended to be honest with the party. In this regard he said straightforwardly: “We know that Zinoviev's declaration was hypocritical toward the party.” The party believed Zinoviev's statement to be honest. Magyar considered it hypocritical. Despite this, Magyar maintained connections with this hypocrite until the very last days. It is a rather strange kind of attitude of a Bolshevik toward the party.

Today Magyar said also that the Zinoviev group fooled him. Meaning that he was an unfortunate fool, that he was fooled by a scoundrel. But he knew that Zinoviev intended to fool the party with his behavior. Thus, he did not need to mention that petty trick with which he himself was fooled. He contradicts his own statement.

But this trickery of the last weeks has shown us that we need to display the strictest vigilance toward all the groups. The case is not just that someone said that he was merely a passive fellow traveler. We know, not just from this case, how factionalist groups behave. Magyar himself said that any such group eventually finds itself on the opposite side of the barricade. Nevertheless, he joined this group. And now he is surprised to find himself on the opposite side of the barricade.

Now he wants to explain everything by his petit bourgeois origin, by his aristocratic ideas, by his hypocritical views. This is too superficial. Take a look at this group of Zinoviev's. It has never been connected to the proletariat; otherwise, it would have never been able, especially in the current situation, to come to such a wild idea as to develop a new opposition on the old platform. But Zinoviev is very well known. For many years he duped the Comintern with his theory of two perspectives. He was expelled from the party three times, and three times he appealed [for readmission]. Three times he betrayed the friends to whom he was tied. And such an educated man as Magyar considered Zinoviev a distinguished personality, from whom he received advice. I am completely unable to understand it. It can be explained by the arrogance of an intellectual who despises the proletariat, who thinks that politics can be made at the expense of the proletariat, not for its sake. We have clearly seen it with the example of Safarov. This man's arrogance was so excessive that he even despised the organs of the Comintern. He would give directives to the parties behind the back of the responsible organs. Parties' representatives did not exist for him. And if he was reproached for this, he felt offended. Only a person who has completely separated himself from the proletarian class can demonstrate such an attitude. Therefore, we have to admit today that Magyar also bears responsibility for what Zinoviev's group has done. It cannot deny its responsibility for Nikolaev and his shots in the back. And people who were members of this group, who advocated such a criminal policy, are therefore accessories to the crimes committed. They cannot be tolerated in the ranks of our party. […]

GURALSKY: Comrades, I was an active member of the anti-Soviet Zinovievite-Trotskyist opposition. I was expelled from the party by the Fifteenth Party Congress. Probably this expulsion from the party was the very best and the most serious lesson that I have received from the party, which made me not only break with the opposition and personally with its members but also thoroughly review all [my] incorrect conceptions on all major questions.

When I was listening to Magyar today, I was thinking: This person has not yet thought seriously about what the expulsion from the party means. Magyar brought forward three points that he wants to use to morally threaten [us]. If I had ever followed even one of these three points, I would never have become an honest party member.

The first point: The situation is such that I cannot act in a right way. Is this the point of view of a revolutionary? It is the point of view of scum, of degenerates. There is no such situation in which a person cannot say to himself: I must serve my proletarian class. There is no such situation. If a person claims that there is a situation in which he cannot properly serve his class, it means that he has lost himself, that he cannot find his way.

Magyar's second statement is of a similar nature: They will not believe me anyway. I am sure that Zinoviev managed to keep whole groups in the opposition precisely by maintaining this point of view — they will not believe you — with the point of view that a correct position is not possible. And finally, it is not true what Magyar says, that he does not consciously deceive the party. Isn't he deceiving the party and himself today? He does, fully and completely. Today in his speech Magyar, on the one hand, covered up the role of the Zinovievite faction and, on the other, did not explain what connected him with the Zinovievite faction.

Comrades, was it just because of personal relations that Magyar wanted to consult Zinoviev on every major problem of the Comintern and international politics? I declare: No, that was the old conception of the Trotskyist-Zinovievite opposition, a conception that does not recognize the whole Stalinist epoch in the VKP(b) and in the history of the Comintern. This was the opposition's basic position, that from the time of Zinoviev's departure [from the Comintern] the history of mankind has collapsed. There is not a million-member party. This is a Trotskyist point of view. This is what Zinoviev embodied in the fascist shot. There is no party left, only its elite. There is no more history of the immense victories of socialism. There is no more history of the transformation of the Comintern from a small German-French party into a world party. What is the Comintern? When I came to work in the Comintern, I heard rumors that Zinoviev had told different people with whom to work and what to do. There is no Stalinist epoch, there is no new era of the international workers' movement, there is no new epoch of the creation of a world party, there is no VKP(b), no industrialization. no collectivization. Only on this basis could anyone step away from the Comintern to a perpetual reading [of Zinoviev's thoughts]. But what does Zinoviev say, what does Zinoviev know, about Lenin's opinion on the global questions? The revolutionary policy became a secret of Zinovievite renegades and not the political line of the Comintern and the VKP(b).

I do not want to deal with the question of whether or not Magyar thought this over. He felt that way. I remember times [when I was in] the opposition when we felt this not in a revolutionary but in a counterrevolutionary way. And he was ten years further along. That is why I think that Magyar has to understand that he has adopted the major Zinovievite position, that there is no Stalinist epoch.

Second, what did the work of the Zinovievite-Trotskyist opposition consist of? It lived a near-party life; it lived as if it were in emigration. The facts have shown what this near-party life, these emigration moods, could change into. Magyar supported these moods, he displayed support for them twice. He supported them when he shared his impression with Zinoviev that there are people in the Comintern who are with him [Zinoviev], who are waiting for him, who seek his advice. He supported them when he committed an anti-Soviet act by lending money to Safarov.

I am interested not only in the anti-Soviet side of his action; I am also interested in the political side of it. Zinoviev and Trotsky say: The people would support us, but the party elite does not let them. Magyar supported this thesis, he supported this idea, and this is extremely important. Magyar still has not thought deeply enough about this question, he is still hostile, he has not yet overcome [his mistakes], he does not yet feel the atmosphere that we have here, he thinks, “Maybe I am giving my game away, too.” He still thinks that he is in the enemy camp, he has not yet overcome this, he is still standing firmly by the position of the Zinovievite opposition.

Comrades, it seems to me that this is the most important and the most harmful [thing] from which the embellishment proceeds. He portrays the case in this way: a small group, a group of fascists, a hated group, wanted to kill Kirov. And this group wanted to kill the party's leader, the best person created by the proletariat. And, on the other hand, in light of these hostile ideas <…>

Comrades, I am ashamed to admit that I was in the ranks of the opposition, but I do not feel any guilt at all in this case. One cannot interpret this question so hopelessly: I planted wrong ideas, and ten years later terrorists grew up. No, the case is different. I think that if Magyar had disarmed today, if he had been able to understand it, he would have come and told the meeting. He would then have fulfilled his role if he had revealed everything he knew [and] why those ideas were mistaken. Then all of us, knowing the milieu, would [be able to] expose not just the ideologists but also the direct perpetuators and instigators of the murder.

Have they not provoked hatred for ten years? Have they not been saying, for ten, eleven, and twelve years that all danger is in the hated party elite? Have they not been inciting the mood that everything that has happened in the Soviet Union, in the Comintern, is a failure? Have not Zinoviev and others been trying to prove that probably the October revolution was Lenin's mistake, that Trotsky was right, that there is no way out? All these are facts. Zinoviev and Kamenev are finished, morally and politically, in the eyes of the proletariat and the peasantry of the [Soviet] Union and in the eyes of the revolutionary workers. And this is what Magyar failed to understand. He should have understood this and proceeded from this point of view to reevaluate his own connections, to explain to himself that politically they meant not what he wanted, not what he thought, not what he felt, but what they had become politically. Politically, they have become a force hostile to our party. That is why I think (I was not cited quite correctly here; I do not know the facts) that, as they said, Magyar represents a mixture of political mistakes, of well-known philistinism and apoliticism. I heard Magyar, I already know the major facts, and it is clear to me that this is [an expression of] Zinovievite degeneration. And let Magyar understand that for the party that clearly wants to remain a revolutionary party, a party of the second round of wars and revolutions, there is only one way: to close its ranks, to forge vigilance, to more actively pursue ideological integrity, to watch very carefully, to judge people by their deeds, to never tell people that there is no way out but to see the situation as it is. Only such a party will be able to fulfill its obligations.

(VOICE: And what shall we do with Magyar?)

Expel him from the party. It is clear.

KON SIN: In his speech Magyar called himself a fool. But he has been masking himself as a fool for a number of years now. Coming to this meeting today, he continues to act in the same way and today, too, he was masking himself as a fool. Magyar said today in his speech that he has been working for a long time in the Comintern, for six years, but in fact he has been working for the benefit of our class enemy. Magyar struggled and continues to struggle against the party, against the CC of our party, against Soviet power, and we can say that Magyar also struggles against the Chinese party and supports counterrevolutionary Trotskyists.

At present, the Chinese Communist Party is at the head of Soviet power in China and the Chinese Red Army, under its leadership, organized Soviet power and the Red Army. Magyar claimed that there are supposedly groups in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Our class enemy also charges that the CC of the Chinese Communist Party, that our CC, is Stalin's faction. Magyar also considers the CC of the Chinese Communist Party [to be] a faction, a group.

In the Chinese Soviet regions, the counterrevolutionary Kliuev has been exposed. He was arrested. However, when Magyar and Safarov learned [about it], they claimed this arrest was wrong, they thought that Soviet power in China oppresses good comrades. Thus, they, too, supported the Chinese counterrevolutionary Trotskyists. Safarov and Magyar suggested sending a telegram [demanding] the liberation of this counterrevolutionary Trotskyist. Therefore, we can see that Safarov and Magyar not only struggled against the VKP(b) and against the CC VKP(b) but at the same time, via the Comintern, struggled against the fraternal parties and against the Communist Party of China.

Therefore, not only do we have to direct our wrath against Safarov, against Magyar, against our class enemy here, but our foreign comrades at the same time have to take note that, in the capitalist countries, those connected with Magyar and Safarov should be exposed. We must also raise class vigilance toward these elements. You have seen that even now Magyar acts like a fool in order to deceive our party, to deceive us. Today at this rostrum Magyar behaved very modestly, very pathetically, as if he wanted to present himself to our party committee as a Communist in order to deceive you once again and to continue struggling against our party.

I think that there is no difference between the crimes of Magyar and Safarov and that of the murderer of com. Kirov, Nikolaev. Therefore, I think that it is not enough to expel him from the party. I think it will be very regrettable if he is not arrested now.

KNORIN: Comrades, when on the evening of 1 December the news about the murder of com. Kirov spread, the heart of each Communist was filled with deep sorrow and anger because it was clear that the enemy inside the country is still alive. The enemy inside the country is still alive.

But the sorrow that filled the heart of each Communist became even more bitter when we read, on 16 December, the resolution of the Moscow and Leningrad [party] committees indicating that the murderers of com. Kirov were party members, that the enemy dwelled in our own house, that the enemy turned out to be inside the party.

More than thirty years have passed since the creation of the Bolshevik Party. The eminence of Lenin was demonstrated when he immediately managed to discern in the first minor contradictions of statutory and programmatic questions another party, the Menshevik party, a party that works against the revolution, a party that has become the worst enemy of the proletarian revolution, the Menshevik party.

Stalin's great intellect and intuition were demonstrated twenty years later when, in 1923, at the time of the opposition's first actions, he discerned in them a new Menshevism, neo-Menshevism, the beginning of the new anti-party group, an anti-Soviet party, a counterrevolutionary party.

More than thirty years of development have brought Mensheviks to form a bloc with all sorts of trash, with the counterrevolution. They were with Kolchak, with Denikin, Bulak-Balakhovich, with all sorts of rabble that attacked the Soviet Union.

More than ten years of development by the Zinovievite opposition have demonstrated that this group, this anti-party group, managed to form a bloc with the most ignoble elements inside the country, with the last fragments of the counterrevolution inside the country, and with the foreign bourgeoisie.

At present, in the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the conditions of sharpened class struggle, counterrevolutionary groups develop, form faster, much faster than in the previous historical period.

Here Magyar delivered a speech that cannot be called anything other than ignoble, infinitely ignoble and impudent, in particular those arguments that he brought up and from which his expulsion followed. If the case was such [as Magyar portrays it], neither of these arguments would justify his expulsion.

It was a cleverly organized, defensive speech. Our comrades have absolutely correctly indicated that today we expel Magyar, exile Safarov [and] banish Zinoviev not for those seeds of distrust toward the party, of opposition to the party, which they planted in 1923–1925. Magyar applied to that period all those definitions that we attach to his group today. Then we referred to those groups as no more than a Social Democratic deviation in our party. Then it corresponded to the actual situation. In 1923–24, it was still a group within the party. By 1927 it had already grown into a different party. It was then that we had to raise a question of expelling them from the party. Organizationally they had formed themselves as another party. Then we had to remove them from the party's ranks.

Around which questions did they organize themselves? Around all major questions, being the enemies of Socialist construction in our country, being enemies of Socialism, as a party, a group that wants to lead our country back to capitalism. They were expelled in late 1927. In 1928 a significant portion of them was readmitted. Magyar avoided expulsion. However, all the double-dealing of this group can now be seen. We have in our possession a letter from Zinoviev to Rumiantsev,

Refers to the letter from Zinoviev to Rumiantsev of 30 June 1928. This letter was used to prove Zinoviev's double-dealing. As a CC member, Knorin was privy to various materials on former oppositionists, materials he quoted from in his speech.

a leader of the Leningrad center of the Zinovievite oppositional scum. In this letter, Zinoviev advises Rumiantsev to rejoin the party, that he file an application in such a way that the CCC [Central Control Commission] would admit him, that he write whatever is necessary, whatever the party would require [from him to be able] to return to the party. Because, he says, the party is facing new difficulties, and the party will need us to struggle for Leninism, i.e., for the Zinovievite oppositional line. This is what Zinoviev wrote to Rumiantsev. This is how he instructed his buddies to return to the party: to capitulate formally in order to struggle against the party.

Of course, one of the conditions was to retain all connections, not in the form of a broad structured organization but in such a way as to be able to survive, to bide one's time to struggle against the party. At the same time, Zinoviev was writing his famous variants regarding which ways he could take: One with Trotsky outside the party, to struggle against the party from the outside. Another way, according to Trotsky, to struggle against the party from inside the party, as Trotsky did. The third way, he says, is to capitulate to the party. It means capitulation. This is the central line that Zinoviev planned at that time.

We exposed it one more time. As soon as Zinoviev sensed some oppositional groups, there he was, he came knocking again [at the door]. We also smashed that group completely. It got no response in the country. A dozen counterrevolutionaries were exiled. Those who maintained connections with them, like Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others, were punished.

It seemed that we had finally defeated the opposition, destroyed this group. But some minor fragments remained, and that is why, by no accident, they were repentant at the Seventeenth Congress.

Yes, they were defeated. Nothing was left but some isolated people, miserable scoundrels who wormed their way into cracks of the party, who were hostile to the party. However, these people maintained connections with each other. It took only a short time [after they were] back in the party to reestablish old friendships; they reached out to those who remained in the old positions. The case is not as simple as Magyar described it here.

The Leningrad center, part of which directly organized the attempt on com. Kirov, this Leningrad center maintained connections with Moscow, with the Moscow center that was headed by Zinoviev, the ideologist, the leader, the unifier of forces within the party to struggle against the party, to struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the return to capitalism. Their program was a program of returning to capitalism.

Magyar did not belong to this leading center. It is obvious, and one should not call him a leader. He is not fit to be a leader. He is far too insignificant. He is much more obscene than a leader. But what in general was the essence of the organization, the essence of the opposition's existence?

The people, the leaders, the bosses, maintained connections; they reached out to those who supported old concepts, old positions, who could be reliable, who could be selected to make a move as soon as the situation was favorable, as soon as new difficulties were created.

One of the accused admits: “We watched for some sort of contradictions in the party leadership. We relied on any opening to help us come to the leadership,

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to come to power. That is why we preserved our cadres, why we established connections with everyone who was against the party leadership, who had an oppositional sentiment. Until the very last moment, we cherished hopes that in this way, through some disagreements, through some difficulties, we would be able to rise to [positions of] leadership and turn the country onto another road, onto our road.”

And so I am asking, Did Magyar belong to this organization that was not based on solidly shaped cells but was an organization built on connections, on gathering forces? Yes, he belonged to this organization.

Probably, obviously, he was not in its leadership, but he did belong to this organization. Hence, Zinoviev's connection with him. Zinoviev is not an apolitical person, he is not a person whose relationships were based on personal friendship and acquaintance. This connection is political, this connection is organizational, this connection meant gathering their people, their forces. That is why the Rumiantsevs and Kotolynovs were coming to Moscow, to establish ties with the Moscow elements. That is why Muscovites traveled to Leningrad to establish ties with Leningrad groups.

Let us take another question. It is quite clear that Safarov has not always been connected with the centers of this counterrevolutionary group in the same way. They say that his connections to this group in late 1932, in 1934, became more frequent, became stronger, [and] that since that time he has become more outspoken, more open with his counterrevolutionary views on questions regarding the Soviet Union, as well as on questions regarding the Communist International. Here is the question: The people who were constantly exchanging their political opinions, how could they have not known it? People who engaged in anti-party, anti-Soviet conversations in their environment, how could they not know about it, not see it? Nobody would believe it.

(MAGYAR: It did not happen in 1934.)

In 1934 you were engaged in anti-party conversations outside the Soviet Union. In 1934 you were waging a campaign and a struggle against the German Communist Party. You transferred the Zinovievite concepts here when speaking about the concentration of leadership, about transferring the leadership to the conciliators,

Conciliators—a group in the German CP that occupied a centrist buffer position between the party's Right wing (Brandler, Thalheimer) and the supporters of the party chairman E. Thälmann, who sided with Stalin.

etc. You did it there. These are proven facts that you cannot escape.

Your role here was one of providing connections and information on the international questions, as well as the role of a transmitter. This is the state of affairs. You want to deny it. It won't work. I will dwell on this question later. This case is rather serious. One can, and should, speak only about that which today is quite clear, is obvious: that this political connection was [also] an organizational connection, which means that Safarov and Magyar belonged to a particular political anti-Soviet organization. It is the only way to see it. We are not little children who believe that friendly conversations between two seasoned politicians who, over the course of many years were tied together by shared political concepts, would not lead to some further goal. This is not the case. And if in 1934 there were still people in the Zinovievite opposition who dreamed of returning to the party some day, this was the common course for the whole Zinovievite group. And, as it was in 1923 and as it was in 1934, this organization, these ties, nurtured the Leningrad group of Rumiantsev-Kotolynov-Nikolaev. They supported this group in those forms of struggle that it took on. This is the essence of the question.

If Zinoviev and Kamenev had sincerely returned to the party, if Zinoviev and Kamenev had said that they capitulated to the party, there would have been no Rumiantsevs, Kotolynovs, or Nikolaevs. They would have not been able to organize themselves and to organize their attempt [on Kirov]. If at the Seventeenth Party Congress this had been seriously exposed; if it had been terminated once and for all, if these elements, with their anti-Soviet counterrevolutionary activity, had not grouped around Zinoviev, the Leningrad group of Rumiantsevs and Nikolaevs would not have been able to count on Zinoviev. This is the essence of the question.

This group was small, it was insignificant, but it inflicted a heavy blow on us. We can say now that we have definitively finished with the opposition within the party once and for all. We are united, and no group can shake the powerful unity of the party. No group can incapacitate the forces of our party.

Let us take what Stalin said two years ago about the kulak. Now it is no longer the big-bellied kulak who comes out in open struggle against the Soviet power. And the inner-party enemy now is not as it used to be several years ago when the opposition was openly led by Zinoviev, Trotsky, etc. The inner-party enemy is now hiding. Like a kulak in a kolkhoz, he is trying to be a steward, to be a keeper of some property, to work on some editorial board in order to smuggle its contraband, in order to say we are still alive, do not forget us, we still exist, count on us.

Such is our inner-party enemy today. Against this enemy other, harsher methods of struggle are needed, and higher vigilance is required of each of us. We are a strong party, a powerful party, and no one can reverse our country's course, Let the Kotolynovs and all others preach the return to capitalism, let them preach about intervention. Under Stalin's leadership, we will move forward at a faster pace. (Applause.) […]

ALIKHANOV: During Magyar's speech we here in the Presidium were laughing—not about Magyar's speech but rather about Martynov's insisting that we give him the floor. And we were saying that Martynov should not be given the floor because he was ill. The laughter was about Martynov's persistence, not Magyar's speech.

(MAGYAR: In this case I am very sorry.)

Of course, there is not much that is funny, to say nothing about joyful, regarding your speech. I think that com. Burzynski is not rejoicing any more than all of us attending this discussion of Magyar's speech are. It's true that there is nothing funny, but does Magyar think that we came here to cry? Does he think that we came here to shed tears? No, comrades, we came here not to cry but to expose the anti-party nature of Magyar, to expose Magyar's dishonest behavior, his dishonest behavior the day before yesterday, and yesterday, and at today's meeting. This is how I understand our task in light of those facts of which I became aware in relation to Magyar. I am not going to distort these facts, since they have been discussed enough today.

Magyar also assesses these facts, but he derives from them a different conclusion than a Bolshevik should. Was Magyar speaking here honestly? Did he speak sincerely at our meeting today? What was he saying? He was saying that one cannot believe the declarations of anyone who once was in the Zinovievite opposition.

This is not correct. We know people who have honestly dissociated themselves from Zinoviev. We also know people who have proved their honesty by [their] deeds, by the struggle against the Zinovievites. Therefore, it is not correct that one should not believe their declarations, as Magyar says. Is he saying it sincerely? No, he is not speaking sincerely, because if he sincerely thinks that one cannot believe their words, then why did he try for a whole hour to whitewash himself through skillful arguments and intricate maneuvers to prove that he was not guilty of what he is accused? It was an insincere speech.

Is it honest on Magyar's part for him to call himself a fool at the party meetings the day before yesterday, and yesterday, and today? It is dishonest and insincere. It needs no proof. Don't we know Magyar?

Is it honest of Magyar to put forward the thesis that the guilt of the opposition's leaders, of Zinoviev and others, the guilt of the active participants of the Zinovievite group and Magyar's ties to these vile murderers, lies not in the present but in the past activities of the opposition? Is his declaration sincere about them planting seeds then, and that now there are fascist sprouts?

I think, comrades, that it is clear that the question here is not only about the opposition's past. We have enough facts proving not only that they planted [seeds] some time ago but that they have been tending those sprouts in the present. These facts are known to the whole country, these facts are known to Magyar. Is it honest on his behalf to declare in his speech that it is only relevant to what he did some time ago? Is it honest to shield himself, and Safarov, and Yevdokimov — i.e., those who are now under investigation and those exiled?

This speech is dishonest and insincere. It is fairly clear to all of us.

Magyar said that he helped Safarov after his arrest and clearly characterized this act. He said he committed a counterrevolutionary act. That's what he said. But is he saying it honestly? No, comrades, not honestly. Because this man explains this counterrevolutionary act by his petit bourgeois individualism, that it was precisely this petit bourgeois individualism that pushed him, Magyar, to support Safarov when Safarov was arrested.

Who is going to believe it? How is individualism related to this? In my mind, by this act he revealed not individualism but collectivism. Collectivism toward whom? Toward the counterrevolutionary Safarov. Why would Magyar need to express this feeling of his in such a way? Why would Magyar be concerned about Safarov's arrest, about his exile, be concerned that his feet not get cold, take the trouble to buy him something and give him money?

Why is this petit bourgeois individualism and not an expression of solidarity with Safarov? He knew Safarov well, perfectly well, and if he, as he says, had any doubts about Safarov or Safarov had cheated him, then, after Safarov was arrested and Magyar not, would it not have become clear to Magyar that to express solidarity with Safarov meant expressing solidarity with Safarov's line? And he speaks at the party meeting and tries to explain the counterrevolutionary act as a result of petit bourgeois individualism. It is dishonest, comrades. Does Magyar not understand that it has become clear to the party organization, and not just to the party organization but to the entire working class, to the whole country, that the Zinovievite counterrevolutionary group organized the murder of com. Kirov? Didn't Magyar try here to deny this fact, to interpret it in a different way, as if it was not the case that the Zinovievites organized [the attempt], that somebody else utilized the Zinovievite ideas? As if it was not the case that the Zinovievites had their terrorist group not just in Leningrad but [also] had their own Zinovievite center in Moscow, and that these were connected. It is all clear. Magyar is trying to confuse these explanations, to disavow the facts that have become so obvious to our whole country.

The last point. I want to talk about another side that was not stressed and that, in my mind, is characteristic of Magyar. I am referring to Magyar's method of self-defense. What did Magyar think about com. Kirov's murder? Did he think the same way as all party members? Was he overwhelmed by the same grief and indignation as the whole party and the entire working class? No, comrades. No, because as Magyar claimed here, he was thinking them not about Kirov but about himself. He said: If I spoke, if I came to the party organization and said that I, as a former member, as an active member of the Zinovievite opposition, bear responsibility for this vile act, then they would say: “He has given his game away.” This is what he thought. He thought about himself, about how to conduct himself so that no one would think that he was giving away his game, how to conduct himself to divert the attention of the party organization away from himself, not how to take any initiative to honestly declare that he bore responsibility. Instead, he decided to sit quietly on the fence, to ride out the storm, to hold out until the party organization called on Magyar and told him: Report, what did you do? Prior to this event, how did you behave toward those people who had ties to terrorists

From here on begins the exposure of Magyar. The unmasking of Magyar revealed his anti-party nature. I think it is more than clear to us, and that we have to say unanimously: There is no place for Magyar in the ranks of our party. (Applause.)

KUUSINEN: Comrades, I took the floor in order to emphasize some of the principal lessons of this case, lessons that are important to all of us.

The first lesson relates to our attitude toward the class enemy. The second lesson is our attitude toward the party.

In our apparatus, yes, in the Eastern Secretariat itself, there was a worker connected to the terrorist, counterrevolutionary opposition. Our great leader, one of the greatest leaders of our Soviet power, com. Kirov, fell victim to this organization. And Safarov, who, as it now has turned out, was nothing but a political agent of this vile counterrevolution, had worked by our side for many years.

What conclusions can be drawn from this? Only one conclusion: to heighten political vigilance in our work, to improve organizational and political vigilance.

We talked with Safarov only about questions of current work. However, I remember one personal conversation with him three or four years ago. It was at the time of the first successes on the kolkhoz front. Then Safarov, after the discussion of some resolution, wanted to add something and said it, or so it seemed to me, in a very sincere manner. But we now know that it was a false sincerity. He said that after all those victories on the peasant issue, only then did he finally understand what a harmful and criminal position he had maintained in the past. It was all lies. He was consciously deceiving us. All that sincerity was false. And the conclusion is: Never take anybody's word, especially that of the former oppositionists, at face value.

Mif mentioned Safarov's book here. This question was raised here at the [party] cell [meeting]. I think that Mif should not have raised this question now. We exposed Safarov's book and qualified it as a Right-Opportunist deviation. The cell made this decision. Possibly the resolution was not completely worked out, but I want to say that if we acted on all questions as we did on this question, that would be sufficient. If we exposed [everyone] to the same extent as we tried to expose Safarov, it would be good.

Now more than ever we need political vigilance. But this is not the most important [aspect of] our attitude, toward Safarov. He displayed a kulak deviation more than a Trotskyist deviation. Today I am absolutely sure of that. He did struggle against Trotskyist views, but he demonstrated a rugged Right-Opportunist deviation.

But we failed to see his fraud in his current work for many years. Did his Menshevik Zinovievite conception negatively affect current work in the Comintern? This question has to be raised. I think that in general the answer is no. As to the resolutions, Safarov wrote very many draft resolutions; but our attitude toward his projects was one of mistrust. I think there was a mistrust on our side; we corrected [those drafts], and I think that if one were to check them, there would be little of Safarov's personal opinions in them. We distrusted him and, of course, would not permit him to develop a political line of his own. But what I am particularly worried about is that he had the opportunity to speak in the KUTV school [Communist University for Toilers of the East].

(VOICE: This is right.)

Or with some colonial comrades, with whom he had an opportunity to speak without witnesses, without anyone from the Eastern Department being present. There is a possibility that he could have palmed off his Zinovievite views. Therefore, we will need to check this out in the Eastern Department.

However, there is no more need to discuss here the agent of the counterrevolution Safarov, simply because the question raised here is not directly [related to Safarov] but to Magyar. Until recent years, we have considered Magyar a capable and useful worker. What we have learned was a complete surprise to us. And the fact that we have only now learned about his ties to Safarov and Zinoviev and other members of this counterrevolutionary center demonstrates the lack of political vigilance. Magyar stressed in his speech here that there was a lack of political vigilance. Magyar stressed in his speech here that he did not belong to this Zinovievite group. However, one can see from the testimony of one of the arrested counterrevolutionaries that they possessed information that Magyar belonged to their group or had connections with their group. Where is the truth here? Magyar himself says that one cannot take words for face value. Do I want to say that I believe that arrested counterrevolutionary more than [I believe] Magyar? No, I do not want to say that. It is possible that Magyar is right. But it can also be that Magyar and that counterrevolutionary are both right, that Magyar belonged and [at the same time] did not belong to the group; it is very possible. As com. Magyar himself stated here, his attitude toward the leading members of this group was one of conciliation to the extent that they might have considered him, if not a member of the center, nonetheless a member of their periphery.

One can consider Magyar a member [of the group] who attached himself to them; however, Magyar takes a juridical view of the case, whereas we are talking of its political aspect. Magyar had a friendship with Safarov. Besides that, he sustained his friendly relations with Zinoviev and some other members of this counterrevolutionary opposition. The result was that he did not tell everything about the conversations that they had to the leaders of the party and to the leaders of the Comintern. He now says that at least the tone [of those conversations] was anti-party and anti-Soviet. However, when Magyar spoke to us or to any other comrade, he gave an impression of a very open comrade who tells everything. It turned out that he talked about everything except the anti-party moods and anti-party tone of Zinoviev, Safarov, and others.

He says that he and Zinoviev had only political conversations. But this is the most important [kind of conversation]. And you had a personal friendship with Safarov. Is it conceivable then that you did not know Safarov's mood, his anti-party, anti-Soviet mood? This friendship of yours with Safarov, who was directly connected with the counterrevolutionary group, was, as it has turned out now, an indirect link to the group that committed a vile terrorist murder. Magyar, such a friendship results in hands being spit on with blood.

The basic obligation of each party member is to not maintain such friendships and such personal relations, which even for a moment [might betray] the slightest overtones, might be embarrassing to reveal to the party. How else will the party be able to conduct its struggle if we do not educate our comrades in such a party spirit? We have to rally closer than ever around the Bolshevik Stalinist party, around Stalin, whom these vile counterrevolutionaries also wanted to kill. It is also a necessary lesson for us.

Also revealing is Magyar's attitude toward the party, and even toward Soviet power, at the time when Safarov was arrested. It often happens that when our comrades are arrested in the capitalist countries, we become worried, we want to take some immediate measures to alleviate their situation, etc. But here a person was arrested under Soviet power, under the dictatorship of the proletariat as a result of a real crime committed, and Magyar becomes worried, he wants to, he tries to help him. He does not sufficiently trust the organs of Soviet power, their fairness, the results of their investigation.

He tries to intervene to counterbalance these actions. How can this be compatible with party membership? How can this be in the least compatible with a Soviet mentality? Com. Magyar said here several times that he deserved to be expelled from the party. I share the opinion that the decision about the expulsion has to be taken. However, this conclusion of Magyar's is not complete. If a comrade still retains remnants of party consciousness, he should not only draw a conclusion like “I deserve to be expelled from the party.” Even if he might have committed a grave crime, he can still ask the party organization, “Even though my fault is such that I deserve to be expelled from the party, I am asking you, since I consider that I still have party consciousness, that I can still be useful to the party, I am asking you to readmit me to the party.” I have not heard such an appeal from Magyar. I was waiting for him to make such an appeal; I would have been delighted to hear it. Maybe he considered that it would be humiliating. Anyway, I think that his conclusion, “just expel me from the party,” is a non-party one. It cannot be explained other than as a lack of party consciousness, a lack of a truly Bolshevik attitude.

Personal relations, personal interests, no matter how cherished they might be, must be unconditionally subordinated to party interests. There is no other attitude for a Communist. It is natural to old Bolsheviks — they do not even have to think about it — but all of us, we foreign Communists, need [to learn] this lesson. We must develop in ourselves a party discipline, an iron discipline. Not a mechanical but a living discipline. We have to educate ourselves in the spirit of always subordinating personal interests and personal friendships to the interests of the party. And what are the party's interests? They are simply the interests of the revolutionary class, the interests of the revolution, the interests of the workers' cause.

At another meeting a couple of days ago, com. Manuilsky reminded us about the example of the civil struggle that the movie “Chapaev”

The movie Chapaev (directed by Sergey and Georgy Vasiliev) was made in 1934. It was based on the story of the Red Army military commander during the Civil War.

demonstrated. Comrades from KIM reacted enthusiastically to the mention of this example. What sort of lesson can be derived from this example? It is a lesson from the times of the Civil War, when people thought that the most cherished, the most important [goal of all] was the cause for which they struggled, when they did not think for a moment that one could put some personal interests before their dedication to the cause. They do not think about their private life; they sacrifice it. But we still have another anti-Soviet war waiting for us. How are we going to face it if we do not educate ourselves and all the rest in this spirit? This lesson is even more important than before. We have to learn this lesson and never forget it for a moment. We have to educate all young comrades in the spirit of these lessons. (Applause.)

BRONKOWSKI: Comrades, as soon as the first word spread about the foul murder of one of the Bolshevik Party leaders, com. Kirov, it was immediately followed by the rumor among the party activists, to whom Magyar belonged at that time, that it was committed by a party member. This news, I must say, spread among the party activists very rapidly. Our first move, our first thought, was to look around, to look at our ways and at the activities of different degenerates, different groups that nurtured the kind of renegades who went so far as to embrace a foul act like the murder of com. Kirov.

And what was Magyar doing at that time? Magyar visited Zinoviev to conduct political discussions. What was Magyar doing after the whole group was exposed, when it was determined who was responsible, politically responsible, for this foul act, and when after that, one of the responsible organizers connected with this group, Safarov, was arrested? He was organizing help for Safarov.

What was Magyar doing when at the party cell [meeting] a question was raised not only about Safarov but already about Magyar? He was actually defending, covering up for, Safarov, covering up for himself.

I ask you, comrades, in the current situation, when there is no other way left for the scum of the anti-party groups to struggle against the party but through underground counterrevolutionary struggle that embraces terror, at this moment can there be a better lesson than this open display of solidarity with and support for those who are responsible for this foul murder, who in one or another way are connected with the organizations, with the executors of this crime?

It seems to me that this alone is quite sufficient to assess the role of Magyar. And Magyar did belong to the group to which also belonged the direct organizer of the murder, Kotolynov, who directly passed on the revolver that fired the deadly bullet at Kirov.

If this person had even an iota of party consciousness and party responsibility left, would he not be compelled to think about all of the connections that he might have had in the past and in the present, and then to come to the party organization, to go to the Soviet organs, and to ask [them] to investigate to the end everything that might help illuminate the real role of the inspirers of the murder and of the murderers themselves? Did Magyar do it? We know that he did not do it. We know that what he did was, in fact, as they said here, to express solidarity with the organizers of the killing and its political inspirers. This is the way to describe the essence of this case in its present form. I think that this is sufficient for a verdict on a former party member.

I am not going to speak about Magyar's false and deceitful stories about his ties to Zinoviev. Com. Heckert has explained to us very clearly the point that, given Magyar's assessment of Zinoviev, an assessment of him as a double-dealer when all the time he was giving false testimony to the party, given such an assessment of Zinoviev, Magyar's visits to one of the very important political workers of the Comintern could not have had the character of consultations, or political discussions about general topics of party life; they could only have had a group character.

Com. Magyar is actually trying to reduce everything to his liberalism, to his petit bourgeois origin. I think it is not the liberalism of Magyar. In fact, Magyar is counting on the liberalism, the remnant of that liberalism that still survives in many of us. This liberalism reveals itself when, out of tolerance, in particular with respect to the comrades with an anti-party past, we do not attempt to look for the political roots of [their] political essence and thus become incapable of revealing their true faces. I think that the conclusions for us, the Comintern workers, have to be particularly acute, since our vigilance has to be higher [and] sharper than in other places, than in any other party organization. Why? Not only because we have Safarov and Magyar, not only because we have had someone else before. It was said here that Zinoviev has not played [his] final role in the Comintern. But if we are to assess this role in the past, we will have to approach it from the viewpoint of which heritage, which remnants of it we still retain. And it looks as though there is still something left. [This role has to be assessed] in the Comintern in particular. < … >

The text is blacked out. (Trans.)

It is possible that such people with anti-party pasts are attracted to the Comintern because it is hard for them to get on in the VKP(b), where it is easier to reveal their [true] face by directly judging their work for socialist construction. Finally, because in the Comintern we are dealing with a great number of parties. With rare exceptions, in the individual parties there are a number of people who have committed mistakes, demonstrated their political inconsistency in other parties, and can serve as the basis for anti-party activities of the different anti-party elements here in the USSR and in the VKP(b). There are two kinds of such elements, and it is worth mentioning them here.

There are Poles, there are Hungarians, there are other nationals who have worked closely with the VKP(b), who have revealed their political face here. They had been in the opposition before, had been expelled from the party, and came back later. Many of them, I can name them, do not want to reveal their faces, do not demonstrate their loyalty to the party through everyday work, i.e., in the socialist construction, where they had been exposed and expelled, i.e., as in the VKP(b). They are either working in other parties or conduct work in the Comintern. Such tendencies are noticeable because the easiest way to reveal such people's faces is through practical work of socialist construction. It is in such work that it is easiest to expose them. This is the first point.

Another type of comrade are those who, on the contrary, revealed their inconsistency, were deviationists and transferred to the VKP(b) in order to reeducate themselves in the environment of the Bolshevik Party and to reveal their faces. This kind of comrade considers it possible to retain false views regarding foreign parties while remaining VKP(b) members. Is it compatible? Hardly, and it represents that particular ground that is so fertile for the seeds of anti-party opposition of a different kind since the VKP(b), the leading section of the Comintern, for the most part determines the line and attitude toward these or other parties. Discontent with any particular party and the Comintern cannot [help] but influence strongly the attitude toward the VKP(b) and its leadership.

We will have to improve our vigilance along this line; we will have to do away with liberalism. Only on this basis will we be able to move forward, having purged our apparatus of the Magyars. We have to purge ourselves of the Magyars as soon as possible. Only then will we be able to actually strengthen our cohesion and to further advance our work, [which is] aimed at bringing the proletariat closer to world revolution, basing ourselves on the example of the VKP(b) and under Stalin's leadership. […]

MANUILSKY: Everything substantial has been said. Magyar, for the last time—he is now citizen Magyar, and you still have to earn [the right] to be called a citizen of the Soviet Union—citizen Magyar asked here at the party meeting for a pass to the [ranks of] non-party members. You will be granted this pass.

I am not going to dwell on this question any longer. I want to draw some political conclusions from what has happened here.

When citizen Magyar spoke here, he said that it was a civil funeral taking place here. No, citizen Magyar, we do not serve civil funerals for Magyars. We have lived through a big funeral, a funeral that stirred the entire party, that stirred all of the workers and kolkhoz peasants of our country. Here, comrades, a political execution is taking place, the execution of a man who deceived the working class, who cheated the benevolence of the party that had forgiven him and accepted him unconditionally to its ranks. In this sense it is a political execution that is taking place here, and we must say plainly and clearly what we are accusing Magyar of. Do you want to know, citizen Magyar, what we are accusing you of? Try to deny it! We are accusing you, and this is a major political accusation, of having the blood of com. Kirov on your hands and on the hands of that group to which you belonged, on the hands of the group of former Zinovievite opposition. Try to wash that blood out! (Applause.)

You did not need to deliver those sorrowful, penitent speeches. Even if you cried from this rostrum, you would not have been able to wash this blood off the hands of the Zinovievite opposition, wash off this political, moral-political responsibility.

It is not important whether it was Magyar or Zinoviev or anybody else from the former Zinovievite opposition, whether it was Kotolynov or Shatsky (who then shadowed [Kirov]) who put the revolver into Nikolaev's hands. Who is Kotolynov? Kotolynov developed out of that ideological school whose leaders were Zinoviev and others. Where was citizen Magyar's ideological vigilance? That group of criminals that dared to attempt the life of com. Kirov grew and developed in this rotten swamp, in underground circles, in the circles directed not against the class enemy, which the German party is struggling against now, but in the underground circles directed against the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the circles where everything is poisoned by the miasma of distrust, gossip, slander against the party, against the working class, against socialism. They say that Zinoviev was an ideologist of this group. But is Zinoviev the only one responsible? No. This whole movement that had been conducting the struggle against the party for a number of years is responsible. It is from here that this miasma grew. And this is the first accusation, citizen Magyar, that the party brings against you, and you cannot wriggle out of it.

Second. Magyar said here that after Kirov was shot, it became crystal clear to him that the opposition had degenerated into an anti-Soviet, White Guard, fascist group. It became clear to you only now? Then tell all the comrades who are present here what happened on 7 November 1927? Here on the streets of Moscow anti-Soviet demonstrations took place that we, the party members, had to disperse.

On 7 November 1927, supporters of Trotsky and Zinoviev organized counter demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad, which were dispersed by the police and voluntary patrols.

It was the day when Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev were touring the workers' districts. For the first time then this group acted as an anti-Soviet group. And that was not a decisive event for you? You had to wait for the shot at com. Kirov to understand the counterrevolutionary nature of the opposition? This is our second accusation to citizen Magyar.

Citizen Magyar said here that he maintained only personal and private relations with Zinoviev and Kamenev, you see. The one who maintained such relations after 7 November 1927 has no right to come and speak today about personal relations only. It is quite clear that what we have here is maintaining [relations] with an organized group, a counterrevolutionary group that had organized anti-Soviet demonstrations.

We are accusing citizen Magyar of a third point. Magyar said here that he conducted political conversations with Zinoviev but never noticed anything anti-party in those political conversations, you see. Stop it, citizen Magyar, stop it. It is not true.

It is not true, and if from this rostrum here today you talked about what you were actually discussing with Zinoviev, I assure you that there would have been a sudden change in the mood of this party organization that is judging you today. If Magyar had spoken sincerely about what he discussed with Zinoviev, it would have happened. Don't we understand that Zinoviev, who had been conducting the anti-party struggle for a number of years, that Zinoviev and Kamenev, who occupied unimportant positions and were dissatisfied with it, did we really think that they never raised political questions about the change of leadership? Excuse me, no one will believe you if you say so, and in this lies your lack of sincerity toward the party.

Comrades, besides those major accusations, here are the three political accusations that today are being brought against Magyar. And this party trial is to decide today whether Magyar is guilty, or not. I am convinced that the party meeting will unanimously say that Magyar is guilty and does not deserve mercy. (Applause.)

There is one more political lesson of tremendous importance, and I want our foreign comrades in particular to understand this political lesson. It is the complete fascist degeneration of Trotsky. It is a new stage in the development of this opposition toward fascism. But is it actually a new stage? No, comrades. Those who witnessed the origins of the opposition in its very first discussions, who followed its development up until the anti-Soviet demonstrations of 7 November 1927, cannot doubt this concept. It is one of the most important political lessons.

I remember, and I want to finish on this, I remember how we all, the delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress, were listening with particular attention to the speech of Sergei Mironovich Kirov. He was standing at the rostrum, so close, so dear to us, and said: “We have won now, we have gained a number of victories, and our mighty, solid, strong army is advancing, its marching sounding like a militant song. But there are still some fellow travelers lagging in the rear. They are trying to keep pace with this mighty class army. They also want to sing, but they sing out of tune.”

Com. Kirov was mistaken in one thing: The fellow travelers turned into white bandits with sawed-off guns shooting [people] in the back. And com. Kirov fell [their] first victim.

Comrades, our great army, called the All-Union Communist Party, is going forward toward new victories, and it is led by the great field marshal, our glorious commander in chief, our beloved Stalin. (Applause.) This army is not afraid of difficulties, it is not afraid of the class enemy, it is not scared by the capitalist world and the Magyars. It will sweep away all those standing in its way. It will, as a powerful wheel of history, smash Magyar and the rest. Our party is going toward new victories under the leadership of our great Stalin. Away with Magyar from the party. Long live the VKP(b) and Stalin. (Applause.)

CHERNOMORDIK: Com. Kotelnikov is forgoing his concluding speech. Are there any declarations?

(None.)

Let me give the floor to com. Alikhanov to announce the resolution of the party committee.

(Com. Alikhanov reads the resolution of the party committee.) (Applause.) CHERNOMORDIK: Are there any declarations or motions regarding this resolution? It is possible to adopt it in principle now. I put it to vote. Who is for adopting the decision of the party committee in principle? All those present here vote, and then, separately, the VKP(b) members. Who is for adopting the resolution in principle? Who is against? Who abstains? (Adopted unanimously in principle.)

(VOICE: I suggest combining both resolutions and then updating them in accordance with today's speech by Magyar.)

A suggestion has been made to combine both resolutions stylistically [and] editorially. Any objections? (None.) Accepted. Second, a suggestion has been made to highlight what is new that was said at the meeting (although I think that Magyar has not added anything new) and to evaluate his behavior at the meeting, based on his speech. (Accepted.)

(GERISH: I suggest changing the paragraph that says that Magyar failed to demonstrate vigilance toward Safarov because he was connected with him.) There is a suggestion to change this paragraph so that it conforms to the whole resolution. (Accepted.)

(ISKROV: I suggest adding the following statement: The fact that Magyar helped Safarov after his arrest is an open manifestation of his hostile attitude toward the organs of Soviet power and proletarian dictatorship.)

It has been [already stated] here. Com. Iskrov suggests giving a sharper formulation by stressing that it is not only the lack of vigilance but an open demonstration against Soviet organs. (Accepted.)

(VOICE: To mention that there was a connection with Kotolynov.)

There is a suggestion to mention the connection with Kotolynov. (Accepted.)

Let us vote [for the resolution] in general. Those voting for the resolution, please raise your hands. Those against … Those abstaining … (Adopted unanimously.)

Second, I can now announce that the Political Commission made a decision yesterday to remove Magyar from the Comintern apparatus. […]

RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL MEETING OF THE PARTY ORGANIZATION OF THE ECCI APPARATUS ABOUT THE EXPULSION OF MAGYAR FROM THE PARTY.

Having heard and discussed the information of the representatives of the party committee and the party group of the Eastern Lendersecretariat regarding the behavior and actions of Magyar, and Magyar's explanations, the general meeting resolves:

Magyar, along with all active participants of the Zinovievite-Trotskyist bloc, as a participant and supporter of this bloc, bears full responsibility for the vile murder of com. Kirov, which was carried out by the black hundreds [chernosotennoe] of the Zinovievite counterrevolutionary group. Along with Zinoviev, Yevdokimov, Bakaev, Safarov, and others, Magyar's hands are stained with the blood of Kirov, a friend and comrade-in-arms of the great Stalin.

Magyar, who has not been exposed by the organs of the proletarian dictatorship [NKVD], who is still carrying his party card, who is aware of his full responsibility for the fascist, black hundred action by the scum of the Zinovievite group, has not taken a single step to admit this responsibility before the party organization in order to assist the party and organs of proletarian dictatorship in thoroughly exposing all the participants, all direct and indirect perpetrators [of the crime], all the organizers and inspirers of the assassins of the popular tribune, of the assassins of one of the leaders of our party.

And even after the whole country had already recognized in Nikolaev, Kotolynov, Rumiantsev, and others the familiar vile image of the Zinovievites, Magyar was preoccupied with only one concern: how to hide himself, how to remain silent and keep a low profile, how not to stick out in order to save his own skin, in order not to attract any attention to himself.

Only after the ECCI apparatus party organization, on its own initiative, demanded that Magyar speak and explain his ties with the counterrevolutionaries of the Zinovievite-Trotskyist bloc was Magyar obliged to speak and to abandon [his] tactics of dishonest silence. But he replaced [that silence] with the no less dishonest tactics of insincere, hypocritical behavior before the party organization, tactics of unscrupulously defending himself and Zinoviev, Safarov, and Co.

The whole anti-party behavior of Magyar derived primarily from the fact that he, until the very last day, maintained permanent connections with Zinoviev, Safarov, Vardin, Gorshenin, and other members of the counterrevolutionary group. Magyar maintained ties to these elements despite the timely and categorical warning of c. Pyatnitsky and despite the fact that this connection could not be justified by any practical necessity arising in the Comintern apparatus. On the contrary, [this connection] hampered the work of our apparatus.

By maintaining permanent connections with Zinoviev, by consulting with him about vital political questions (the construction of socialism in one country, the role of Stalin, the murder of c. Kirov, Lenin's opinion about the military alliance, etc.), Magyar tried to prove to the ECCI party organization that Zinoviev held correct party positions on all questions.

By maintaining close, friendly relations with Safarov, discussing vital political problems with him, Magyar is trying to prove that Safarov had no anti-party or anti-Soviet views or moods.

Although Magyar maintained close, personal, intimate, and permanent relations with these traitorous elements and was no doubt aware of the real moods of these counterrevolutionary elements, not only did he fail to promptly signal the party about them, but at the party meetings he did not expose them politically or assess the true worth of the anti-Soviet Zinovievite group's actions [nor] his own connections with the group's leaders and members. The general meeting deems Magyar's attempt to portray himself as a “disoriented fool” and to thereby justify his anti-party behavior an obviously calculated maneuver by which Magyar attempted to obscure the case and to avoid party responsibility.

The meeting notes Magyar's insolent attempt to portray, in retrospect, the group of Magyar, Vardin, and Safarov, to which belonged Kotolynov, a direct organizer of the murder, as the most honest and sincere part of the Zinovievite opposition.

The general meeting notes with disgust the counterrevolutionary behavior of Magyar as reflected in his maintenance of relations with Safarov after his arrest. He gave advice to people close to him and gave money to Safarov, who had been arrested in connection with com. Kirov's murder. This miscreant, anti-Soviet act of Magyar is nothing but an [open] demonstration by Magyar against the organs of proletarian dictatorship and their struggle against the scum of Zinoviev's counterrevolutionary group.

Considering that Magyar is an alien and hostile element in our party, who has retained ideological-political and organizational ties to the Zinovievite counterrevolutionary group, [the party meeting resolves to] expel Magyar from the VKP(b).