PROTOCOL No. 11 OF THE CLOSED MEETING OF THE VKP(b) MEMBERS AND CANDIDATE MEMBERS IN THE ECCI SECRETARIAT of 22 JUNE 1937.

PRESENT: 166 VKP(b) members.

PRESIDIUM: Moskvin, Blagoeva, Gopner, Kotelnikov, Angaretis.

Secretaries: Volk, Bialkovskaia, Smirnov, Paglina.

HEARD: Information by c. Kotelnikov about exposing the enemies of the people who worked in the ECCI apparatus.

RESOLVED: To ratify a decision by the party committee to expel from the party enemies of the people Walecki, Chernomordik, Chernin, Bronkowski, and Grossman.

HEARD: Report by c. Moskvin about the measures to improve the [political] health of the ECCI apparatus. […]

Com. Stalin has stressed specifically what an unpleasant thing capitalist encirclement is. The recent trials have demonstrated to us what this capitalist encirclement means. Each of us has to thoroughly contemplate the question of how deeply the class enemy has penetrated into the very pores of our Soviet system. There is hardly any sector of our construction where the enemy has not found ways to entrench himself and to attempt to undermine the fortress of our proletarian dictatorship from the outside.

Albert—alias of Albert Zyltowski (aka Wiktor Bertynski).

We are the organization that, more than any other, stands at the junction with the capitalist world. To our shame, one has to admit that our vigilance proved to be at a lower level than in the other organizations of the VKP(b). We see a picture of profound penetration by the enemy into the most important parts of our apparatus. The most affected are two such important sectors as communications and cadres. It turned out that both the old and the new leaderships were from the same camp. We watched cockfighting staged before us: Müller [B. N. Melnikov] against Abramov, etc. In reality, it is one and the same gang. One has to take this fact into consideration. It was a veil. If the next time one [person] exposes another before us, we should not take the side of one of them. It will be necessary to verify both of them, or else we may be tricked.

I have to admit my grave mistake that I committed in regard to Müller. I am responsible for it more than anybody else. Particular details that can justify this case are of no importance. The biggest mistake was that we [placed] too much trust in this sector and had little control over it. And when we felt that things were going wrong, we raised the question of removing Müller. I have to say that we could have removed him earlier. Incidental reasons delayed his removal. However, we failed to see the enemy in him, we failed to expose [him]. It turned out that he had been deceiving the party from almost 1919. Everybody knows that the OGPU leadership was saturated with enemies. This is why this scoundrel was exposed so late. He, like Abramov, could have been exposed many years earlier.

Of course, that does not mean that somebody [else] has to do our work. The organs of the proletarian dictatorship are doing their job and, under the leadership of com. Yezhov, will occupy their position of honor, a position that they should occupy. But that does not free any of us from the duty to be vigilant, to honestly serve the party in any sector of any work.

Look what happened. The most important sector—communications—turned out to be in the enemy's hands. The other most important organ—cadres—had been in the hands of the enemy for a number of years, since its creation. The enemies did not just enter them yesterday. I noticed that everybody was shocked by the arrest of Alikhanov. He seemed to be very much a party person. He managed to fool our whole collective, and the secret ballot [party election in spring 1937] gave him the majority of votes.

(GOPNER: In a situation when there was a lot of agitation in favor of his candidacy.)

It reflects the level of our organization.

The situation in some sections turned out to be very bad. In the German section, a number of people who used to work in our apparatus were arrested: Richter, Remmele, Neumann. In the Polish section: Bronkowski, Albert.

Krokodil—a satirical magazine, published from 1922.

And these two people controlled all the cadres of the Polish underground [party]. This is the reality.

It is hard to say where the limits of this treason are and what sort of miscreants are still to be exposed, are still hiding, etc. There are too many channels through which the enemy can sneak into our apparatus. That is why genuine Bolshevik vigilance is an essential condition for each of us. We have to expose, in a Bolshevik manner, everything that has hindered the organization of struggle against the enemies.

I wanted to draw the attention of [our] organization to one circumstance that I consider a great misfortune, [and did] even earlier. But I still do not have the concrete facts. I am referring to familyness. At our previous meetings we hardly even raised the question of familyness in the apparatus of the Communications Department. But tell me, was there not familyness in the old Cadres Department? Alikhanov and Chernomordik protected each other. And since they were members of the party committee, was there not familyness in the party committee, too? Yes, it was so, and it restrained the organization from exposing enemies.

In this connection, the ECCI Secretariat created a commission [the Moskvin Commission] to verify the apparatus. Socially, our apparatus is petit bourgeois. There are very few proletarian elements [who were] forged in the [class] struggle. Last year already, during a superficial verification, we learned that dozens of workers [of our apparatus], although they had worked here for years, had tarnished political reputations, as if it was supposed to be this way. A decision was taken to cleanse our apparatus of such people, about whom it is still impossible today to say whether they were enemies or not. This refers to each one personally, but altogether, when there are dozens of them in our apparatus and when they are entrenched in different sectors, it creates a very dangerous situation for our apparatus; i.e., an environment is created that enables the enemy to penetrate our apparatus. A spy does not necessarily have to sit in the apparatus (to our shame, there were such in the apparatus). He can do his work through higher-level and lower-level workers. We have to pay equal attention to each worker. Let us take a janitor. She comes to the office earlier than anybody else to clean up. She has to be an honest person, faithful to her fatherland. This is the [right] attitude when staffing the apparatus. First of all, we have to get rid of the politically unstable [workers] with dubious political ties. We do not need them in our apparatus. Let me take Siksoi as an example. We decided to remove her from our apparatus. You all know her. She spoke here. The general meeting rejected her. Do we need a person like Siksoi? The commission decided that we do not, and the Secretariat agreed. Or [take] Martha Morenz, or Borosh. First and foremost, we have to get rid of those elements with suspicious political ties and introduce new people in their places.

Then there is the group of people who had [committed] serious political mistakes, and who are also unsuitable for work in our apparatus. In general, since its creation the commission [to verify the ECCI apparatus] has removed from the apparatus sixty-five people so far, excluding those seventeen who were removed by NKVD organs. A special commission, created by the Secretariat, is working on verification of the workers of the Communications Department. In addition to that, a commission is working to verify the composition of the [apparatus] workers. In general, the reorganization spearheaded by the special troika (under the leadership of c. Dimitrov) will result in a radical reduction of the whole apparatus of the Communications Department and changes in its whole system. Besides that, a re-registration of our whole apparatus is necessary, because the personal files of most of our workers are in a chaotic state. And we have to know each worker in our apparatus.

Then the Secretariat considered it necessary to transfer a number of workers from one department to another. Here c. Dimitrov asked us especially not to treat the transferred comrades as suspicious but to create an atmosphere that is conducive for their work.

Finally, a series of measures have been planned to verify and staff our apparatus, etc.

In conclusion, I would like to speak to you about one thing. Recently I read in “Krokodil”

Semyon Davydovich Vulfson was deputy head of the trade delegation in Italy in 1924–1925, head of the trade delegation in Austria in 1925–1927, deputy chairman of Exportkhleb (Bread Export) in 1927–1928, and a foreign director of Exportkhleb in Rotterdam in 1929–1930. He died in March 1932.

how one person learned about a state secret. He told it to his first-floor neighbor. [Eventually] this secret made its way to the seventh floor. The last person had no one to tell it to, so he went down to the first floor and told it to the person who first learned the secret. What I want to say is that one has to know how to keep his mouth shut because the enemy has big ears. Foreign counterintelligence is very interested in our apparatus. It is not advisable to babble about these arrests. The investigation is under way, and it is the duty of each of us to help it and not to babble. After the investigation is completed and we get the information, it will be possible to inform our collective about the details in order to draw conclusions and learn lessons.

We are making this announcement to you, and we expect from each of us and from everyone in our organization all possible help. Thanks to this idiotic disease, carelessness, spies were able to put down roots in our organization. We have to help our organization to rebuild itself and to make each of us so perceptive as to be able to expose our enemies. We have to roll up [our] sleeves and get down to work. I believe that we will salvage our apparatus from the poor state in which it finds itself today.

KOTELNIKOV. In his speech, com. Moskvin demonstrated the weakness of our party organization that failed to expose and remove in time the enemies who were later removed from our apparatus by NKVD organs. Fifteen enemies occupied important positions here. Until their arrest, our party organization did not deal with them. Some of them were exposed by NKVD organs without help from our party organization. It reveals our weakness in raising the revolutionary vigilance of each of us. The enemy proved to be more cunning than we were. Alikhanov and Müller—to our shame, we trusted them too much. Were there signals that should have caught our attention? Take Müller: his grand lifestyle, throwing money around, winning [people] over with money, elements of moral degeneration about which some members of the party knew to some extent. None of this aroused the appropriate party suspiciousness, nor did it make any of us worry. It was known that in 1923–24, he was an active Trotskyism The organs of the proletarian dictatorship have arrested him as a spy. But he could have been exposed earlier. It was not done, and our party organization bears responsibility for it. The leadership is also responsible.

Alikhanov —there had already been Zholdak's speech at the general meeting. It was a small signal, but nevertheless we had to pay attention to it. It was not done. Moreover, Alikhanov was taken under protection. In my speech I characterized him as a good party member. It reveals my blindness and stresses my responsibility before the party.

Chernomordik—we would have been able to expose him much earlier if we had not limited ourselves to trusting his reports, if we had not trusted his word. We did not check the documents, we did not ask questions with the appropriate party thoroughness. And in his sphere of work Chernomordik deceived the party organization and the leadership. One had only to dig into the materials and his true nature as an enemy of the people and of the party would have been exposed.

These three—Alikhanov, Chernomordik, Müller—were members of the party committee. You remember our discussion on the question of reprimanding the comrade who had lost his party card. Müller wanted to show himself as an extremely vigilant person, but behind that person was hiding an enemy, a spy from the very first years of our socialist state. The same with Alikhanov. This double-dealer has been deceiving the party organization for years. In any case, during my work with him directly in the party committee, I did not see his real face, I did not see through him. I was depending on the fact that the leadership trusted him, that he was a tested comrade, etc. [It is such] superficial tranquility that leads to political blindness. From this derives the responsibility of the party committee and me personally, as a secretary of the party committee.

Let us take the party group of the Communications Department. The largest number of enemies was arrested there. There were elements of moral degeneration there, but nobody reacted to it. Müller spent tens of thousands [of rubles] on parties, apartments, etc. < … > ho tried to create for himself authority within the Communications Department.

Anikalchuk also spent < … > money [lavishly] here and there. The members of the party group did not help to expose these miscreants; the same was true in the Cadres Department. There is only one possible conclusion: lack of self-criticism, elements of familyness, the lack of a desire to raise principled questions, etc.

Our party organization now faces a task: to make every effort to liquidate the results of the enemies' work, of their counterrevolutionary activities in our apparatus. We heard a statement from one comrade who said that because I worked by his side and failed to expose him, I myself should leave. Comrades, this is an incorrect way to pose this question. To go or to stay, the collective, the party organization, the leadership, will decide this; we should not demobilize by ourselves. Each of us works in some sector, and each is required to help the leadership overcome the results of the enemies' counterrevolutionary activities here.

It is essential to study the enemy's methods of work, to study the materials and articles that are published now. This should be done by the experienced workers. The enemy sneaks into our apparatus thanks to our blindness and the lack of party vigilance. This demonstrates once again how right c. Stalin was when he emphasized the importance of capitalist encirclement. Our task is to raise party vigilance.

I am ashamed to face the party organization because for three months three enemies of the party worked alongside me in the party committee.

I was a party leader for more than a year, in a period when one enemy after another was relieved by the leadership. I failed to respond to the signals, to react in a timely manner. It is a shame, and it is very depressing, especially because of the one who skillfully played the role of a good party member. I trusted Alikhanov just as you did, but I had no right to do so, because I was also a cadres worker. I had to grasp those signals, I had to grasp the signal sent at the general party meeting (citations from his books, his speech at the meeting on the report of the party committee). I should have studied his biography more thoroughly.

It was not sufficient to satisfy ourselves with Chernomordik's statement about his Trotskyist error. We should have asked that party organization of which he was then a member, which we [only] did later. It was essential to restructure our work not in words but in deeds.

We had to investigate the friendship of Chernomordik and Alikhanov. Gopner's protest against their attitude toward her should also have served as a signal. Alikhanov knew how to dull vigilance; they charged me with the most secret tasks. He wormed his way into [people's] confidence everywhere, and into the party organization. The party group has the right to raise the question of whether I should remain a party leader, and the general meeting [to discuss] whether I should remain a member of the party committee.

No. 3. NUSBERG

Com. Samsonov was right when he demanded a discussion of all of these issues.

I work in the Cadres Department. Familyness was not only between Alikhanov and Chernomordik. There was also friendship and familyness between Blagoeva, and Alikhanov and Chernomordik. And a very notable friendship existed between Razumova and Lebedeva, and Alikhanov and Chernomordik. Alikhanov tried to suppress self-criticism by referring to conspiracies. Com. Blagoeva failed to expose it. I know com. Gopner as an authoritative party member, but in our group she was pushed aside. The staffing of the Cadres Department was such that, even in the last months, undesirable individuals were admitted. A non-party member, Loganovskaia, whose husband turned out to be an enemy of the people, was entrusted with handling top-secret documents, which should be entrusted only to tested Communists. I told cc. Blagoeva, Tsirul, and Manuilsky about a number of people who turned out to be enemies. My mistake was not to report it to the party committee secretary. Once I went and spoke about my suspicions regarding Pataki, and I presented materials proving that he was a scoundrel. Nevertheless, he was removed only later, at the suggestion of the NKVD.

For some reason, references [kharakteristiki] for departing workers were given by the Cadres Department; the party committee and the social organizations were cut off.

It is not good when one person is in charge of the apparatus. The commission to verify the apparatus works slowly.

The fault of the party committee is that, knowing the bad [facts] in Krajewski's [and] Chernomordik's pasts, the party committee nevertheless made them speakers at the Moscow party committee; it did not verify these people's pasts.

[Tamara Akimovna] VULFSON.

I met Abramov in 1924, in the USSR embassy in Berlin, when the deceased c. Vulfson [her husband] and I went abroad for the first time.

In 1918–1924, L. B. Kamenev was the chairman of the Moscow City Soviet.

Later we went to Italy, where Vulfson was a deputy trade representative, and after that to Vienna, where c. Vulfson was the trade representative, and I worked in the USSR consulate and later in the trade delegation. In April 1927 we returned to Moscow. In June, I started working in the Inotass [foreign news agency] as an intern. However, I failed my English test and had to leave. At that time, Vulfson was not in Moscow, and so I called Abramov and told him that I was looking for a job. He suggested that I come to him. I called on him the next day. After working in the OMS for a week or two, I said that it was difficult for me to deal with the English language. Then he recommended me to the Agitprop [Department]. In the fall of 1927, Vulfson returned from his business trip. Abramov and his wife visited us three times in two years (1927–1929), and we visited them twice. In 1929, c. Vulfson and I again went abroad. I returned to Moscow alone, because c. Vulfson died in a Berlin hospital on our way back to Moscow. I went to work for the ECCI for the second time, after talking with com. Tsirul. I never again saw Abramov at home, but I called him at work when I was hospitalized for five months in the Kremlin hospital. I asked him to come to see me and asked if he could get me a place in a sanatorium. It was in August 1935. He came, and I repeated my request. He promised [to fulfill it]. In the final account, I got a place [in a sanatorium] thanks to c. Gopner, who also knew how badly ill I was during these five months.

That was the last time I saw Abramov and called him on the phone.

I can say that in our publishing sector there were enough scandalous cases: the Chernin case and others. The party group has to know its members better. It is better to go too far, to commit mistakes when purging the apparatus, rather than to let the enemy stay. Each of us has to remain in his place. I promise to be vigilant; I will mobilize myself.

(NUSBERG: And what did you do in Kamenev's Secretariat?)

I had the archive of the Political Bureau of the CC VKP(b) in the cabinet there. But I do not remember an instance when I actually held those files. I translated from English some pamphlet by Lansbury. I was called upon to translate when the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet received foreigners.

Refers to the VKP CC Plenum that took place between 23 February and 5 March 1937.

I will give some examples of irresponsibility in our apparatus. In the Communications Department there worked one Yaschenko, Müller's shield bearer. She protected his office as if it were a sanctuary. No mortal could come to see him.

For a long time Loganovskaia worked in the apparatus. About a month ago I needed to see Alikhanov and ask him why leaving the doors open had become more frequent of late in the Cadres Department. She did not let me in to see Alikhanov. Yesterday she came again. Why did they let her inside the building? In the warden's office there is a reception room, but that room is not being used. In this regard, we lack vigilance. Such a system of controlling people is no good.

Take Walecki. At the party committee meeting, he behaved in such a way as to stress that he was an old party member and that, therefore, there could be no doubts about him.

Last year, when Kotelnikov was on vacation, Alikhanov replaced him. Wo had to solve the problem of assistance to low-paid workers. However, he showed no concern for people.

A new person, who did not know Müller, was hired. When that new person asked Müller for a pass, Müller replied, “Tell Davydov not to put anyone here without my consent,” by which he meant that he wanted to secure [positions for] his people there, too. Abramov also threw a tantrum for us [when we] asked him to present his pass.

We received alarming signals from the warden's office: in the Cadres Department, they used to leave rooms open; once a fire happened; there were cases when the light was not switched off, etc. Nevertheless, the enemy, the former head of the Cadres Department, did not pay any attention to our signals from below.

Chernin weaseled around to prove his guiltlessness.

Com. Moskvin was right when he said in his speech that we need honest people on whom we can rely. The party groups have to undertake a serious verification of their groups, of their composition. It is essential to review the whole system of party education, since among the leaders of the study groups there were many enemies. We have to promote honest and devoted people to become leaders of the study groups.

I would like to focus on Müller's characteristics. Müller organized drinking bouts and spent tens of thousands [of rubles] to decorate offices; many Communists groveled before him. Kozhevnikov decorated rooms in the Rococo style and spent twenty-five thousand rubles on it.

When Müller was coming, Kozhevnikov set up dinners with the most exquisite wines and dishes.

I talked about this with party leader Yankov, but he only shrugged his shoulders.

Why did it take place? Because the party committee was removed from those sectors, it did not teach us vigilance. Bolshevik self-criticism is to be promoted regardless of the special character of our apparatus.

Kozhevnikov is a bureaucrat; it is necessary to purge such people. One has to keep secrets but at the same time to watch so that the people with the party cards do not squander party money.

No. 7. MERING

After the harsh words in c. Moskvin's report in which he demonstrated that we lack party vigilance, it is especially difficult to speak about myself. At the election meeting, I stood for Alikhanov; I had not seen any [evidence of] deviations by him since 1928, when I first met him.

There was a signal about Alikhanov at the election meeting. We should have paid attention to it. Alikhanov's speech contained a suppression of self-criticism, it contradicted the line of the Plenum.

Refers to the Constitution of the USSR adopted by the Eighth Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of the USSR in November 1936.

We recognized his speech as incorrect but let him off easy. It was my mistake, too. I had no personal ties with Alikhanov; we were connected by work and study. And I failed to see through him. I am blameworthy for a significant lack of vigilance. In 1932–1933, I met with the double-dealer and enemy of the people Shatskin. I met him several times. We met because we were connected at work. I did not carry on political conversations with him. I never shared his anti-party views. We discussed only his departure from the opposition. When he asked, What's new in the Comintern? I answered that I did not know. I aggravated my mistake by not reporting my meetings with him to the party organization.

TSITOVICH

We talk a lot about vigilance, but it was not we who exposed them, but the organs of the proletarian dictatorship. I think that the Central Committee and c. Stalin demand from us not the kind of criticism that we used to have. We repeatedly refer to the distinctiveness of our organization and talk about other practical considerations. If we raised all of the questions with complete party honesty, we would have exposed all the enemies much earlier. At the election meeting, when the discussion became very critical, Alikhanov raised the question about terminating the discussion. We talked about many wrongdoings, but we failed to notice the most important. Vulfson was wrong when she said here that it is no big deal if we go too far. No, it is necessary to hit the target, or else we will do our enemy a service speaking that way. This means that each small signal has to be investigated to the end. Obviously, it is not a pleasant thing to be investigated (I know it firsthand), but each party member and the entire party organization have to bring each undertaking to an end.

Müller's case is not clear to me. It turns out that in the past, Müller was a Trotskyist. I think that the party committee and the leadership have to investigate this case further. We do not have here a single comrade who knew about Midler's Trotskyist past. I think that the party committee has to investigate who knew about Müller's Trotskyist past and remained silent.

Regarding Alikhanov. There were signals. Ten months ago, com. Grishenin (he works in the Far Eastern regional party committee) conveyed that Alikhanov was a good friend of one miscreant, an enemy of the people who committed suicide, and that this person used to visit Alikhanov in his apartment. I reported it. Goldshtein reported the same thing. This case lasted for two to three months. We thought that our suspicions were not grounded. Then came the party committee elections. That evening, when Alikhanov's candidacy was discussed, I had been mobilized and was out of Moscow. Later I wondered if Alikhanov mentioned this fact in his biography. As it turned out, he did not. Goldshtein was ill at that time and in the hospital, but a number of comrades who knew about the case were present.

Later, a small group of [party] activists met. There I heard information about Müller for the first time. This information was given by the enemy of the people, Alikhanov. I spoke with c. Moskvin about this fact. I told him that this fact confused me a lot, and that I thought that the leadership should investigate whether the suspicions were groundless or whether they were serious.

(MOSKVIN—This fact was reported to the leadership, and Alikhanov did not conceal that he was close with Calzan.)

However, the [party] organization did not know about those ties. I think that it should have been brought up at the meeting when he was giving his autobiography. We often think that if one is a leading worker, this is sufficient.

Walecki, Bronkowski, and I worked on the editorial board of the “Kommunisticheskii Internatsional.” I have to say that after Bronkowski and Walecki came to work on the board, the atmosphere there became very difficult. Kotelnikov was the only person with whom one could talk. In fact, a Polish faction, rather an enemy faction, was created in the “KI.” I used to feel uneasy whenever I walked in there.

The organization knew Walecki well enough from his work in different sectors. It is typical of him to be concerned about money. As soon as he came to the board, he brought up the issue of raising his salary. Everybody knows Walecki's lifestyle, his looking down upon rank-and-file workers, often changing wives. It seems to me that we have to keep an eye on a person who is hungry for money.

Conclusion: we have to undergo a profound reorientation. Only then will our collective, which is quite qualified, be up to the tasks facing it.

SHOLOMOV

The speeches by cc. Kotelnikov and Blagoeva are not quite sufficient. They criticized themselves enough, but in light of the newly discovered facts, the problems are now viewed differently, and therefore, we have to restructure our work on a new basis. Our vigilance is insufficient. It is essential to invent methods to restructure the work of our apparatus and to discuss in [party] groups all of the issues relating to this restructuring.

We have to study the methods of work of the enemy who operate in our apparatus. I realize that it is impossible to do now, but in the future, we must outline the methods of the enemies who are operating in our organization. For example, Alikhanov gained trust with his seeming straightforwardness.

Chernomordik and Alikhanov restrained criticism at the general meeting. Do not go too far, they said.

C. Kotelnikov has a formal approach, [and] he is not getting any deeper. Alikhanov and Chernomordik lorded over the party committee, in fact, they were the leaders of the party committee. Our party organization is not solid. I There are] bureaucratic struggles between the departments. It is necessary to raise self-criticism to a higher level. It is necessary to propagandize the good examples of the individual Communists who displayed vigilance, who managed to expose the enemy. Com. Kotelnikov raises the question of no confidence in the party committee. I think that we should not do it, we only have to restructure ourselves faster.

No. 10. KOZHEVNIKOV

Levchenko was quite correct in his speech. They had been squandering resources, not tens of thousands, but millions, for many years. I reject the accusation that I am a bureaucrat. It was not I who squandered the money but those who were responsible for that money. I have been working in the apparatus for a little more than a year and did not understand the situation of the supposed struggle of Müller against the Abramovshchina [Abramov group]. How did my political blindness reveal itself? In the fact that I was never critical of what was going on around mo. Thanks to that, subversive activities passed by me. There were signals, but the party committee, thanks to Alikhanov and Chernomordik, smoothed everything over. Here is one signal: One party member declared that he was going to give up his party card because wrongdoings were taking place around him and he was not able to put a halt to them. The party committee charged Müller and Chernomordik with investigating this case. There was a signal, and it faded. The same enemies used to come to our sector with party tasks. Once it was Kotelnikov, but even he was guarded so that he did not see, or, it is better to say, so that he could only see what was shown to him. […]

I am at fault for trusting Müller. There were drinking and degeneration, and we failed to take those signals into consideration; we did not pursue them only because we considered that it would undermine his authority. […]

NOVIKOV

[…] The familyness in the Communications Department has no equal in other departments. Clashes between old and new workers took place. Self-criticism was not encouraged. Both Alikhanov and Chernomordik played leading roles in the party committee. […]

SAMSONOV

We are examining a very serious question. Com[rades] Stalin and Lenin said that capitalist encirclement of the USSR leads to confrontation between the capitalist elements and the USSR. It is essential to improve [our] study of the issue of the activities and methods of the bourgeois intelligence services that are struggling against us. How could it happen that the enemies Alikhanov, Müller, and Chernomordik were “the heart and soul of the organization”? It is a slap in our face. The speeches by c.c. Kotelnikov and Blagoeva are completely incorrect. At two meetings, the enemies completely discredited me. As is known, the enemies are trying to buy off honest people. Last year, Alikhanov managed to get 100,000 rubles illegally from the Administration of Affairs Office through the party committee. [That money] was given to social organizations. At the meeting, they justly criticized me on some issues, but the enemies consciously tried to discredit me. I fought this gang from a position of principle. The argument centered on questions of principle (estimate, etc.). This gang discredited me for defending party positions. Why did they work over c. Gopner at the party committee for saying that the enemy Chernomordik behaved in a Trotskyist way? I insisted that all those who had worked in Zinoviev's Secretariat should not work in the apparatus, but Chernomordik did not agree with this. Com. Drizul told me that Chernomordik was a dangerous person for our organization. Müller [and] Alikhanov discredited the Stalinist constitution

Ty is a familiar, friendly way to address a person, as opposed to Vy, a more formal address. (Trans.)

when, referring to “attention to real people,” they supported the enemies. I was absolutely right in my suppositions, and in my struggle I was not mistaken. When Alikhanov realized that I was struggling against him, he created his secret headquarters, which intercepted statements and spread rumors about me. I sent Alikhanov a statement regarding one party member. It became known to that person, probably from Alikhanov. Things are going badly in the Cadres Department. It was clear to me that personnel files were in danger. Facts and signals were not followed through on. C. Blagoeva said that everything was fine in the Cadres Department. Why did c. Blagoeva say nothing today about suppressing criticism[?] Where was com. Kotelnikov when I was unjustly criticized, and he himself permitted incorrect criticism[?] A rumor was intentionally spread that I had a “tail” of nineteen people. The verification showed that this was not true. Com. Kotelnikov does not have to cover me up. You have no such right, c. Kotelnikov. The party will set things straight and protect me. Influential members of the party committee, like Alikhanov, discredited me, and com. Kotelnikov did not straighten them out. Com. Kotelnikov, you worked in the Cadres Department yourself. Why was the “criticism” of familyness no directed to the Cadres Department, to the OMS and other departments, but only to the Administration of Affairs Office? There is no answer to this question. I am accused of suppressing Gurevich, supposedly because he is a Jew this comes from Alikhanov. The enemies bribed us. When I spoke against bribes, Alikhanov said that I was slapping the organization across the face. Regarding Pataki—there was a statement that he was a Trotskyist; nonetheless, he continues to work. Müller spoke at the meeting and said that he was supposedly annoyed tat they did not criticize im. This is the mask of the enemy I am not satisfied with the speeches by c. Kotelnikov and c. Blagoeva. At the last party committee [meeting] before the elections, com. Kotelnikov said that Samsonov ought to know how to behave, or else they would criticize him. I stated that I felt bad at the party committee, because more than half of them were Trotskyists. They said here that there were signals regarding some issues. We have to elect a commission to investigate how to look into those signals. The party organization has to discuss whether or not look into those signals. The party organization has to discuss whether or not c. Kotelnikov and c. Blagoeva Should continue to be members of the party committee.

TSIRUL

C. Samsonov spoke here regarding Pataki, that accusations against him were unsupported. If Pataki is at large now, it does not mean that he will be at large [in the future].

During the break, Samsonov remarked, Let us see how Tsirul will speak. Comrades I am not going to speak here as the accused. I had no personal friendship or ties with any of these enemies. My great fault is that I had to work together with three of these enemies for some time, and I failed to expose them At the meeting I supported Alikhanov against Zholdak, although I maintained closer relations with Zholdak.

I will speak individually about each of the five enemies who were removed from our apparatus.

Müller, under him there existed an atmosphere of groveling and bribery, which found its best expression during the New Year party; all the workers of the Communications Department praised Müller and even awarded him a prize for the best dance. Müller had a secret system of bonuses; one would go directly to the accounting office to get his bonus. There was no political essence in his issue.

Walecki—he had a different style, an artificial rudeness. You say one word, he would say ten. He would yell [and] bang his cane. Once he wanted to beat a chauffeur because he did not like the car that he was given.

Krajewski—I have worked with him occasionally since 1932. We thought him to be a badly organized person, an artisan doing everything by himself, a bad administrator. We criticized him hard for that. He was afraid to let other people know about his work.

Chernomordik—basically the same unorganized person, lacking any system. He kept papers in his drawer for about six months and then wrote, to file, without even writing down the date. Now I understand that that was his method of work in order to conceal everything.

Alikhanov —this one had a different method. First, he worked in the Organizational Department. He could do nothing wrell; everything went bad there. I asked him: Why do you hang around here, not knowing the languages, not knowing the situation in the countries? And he replied that he had a stomach ulcer and needed diet food and treatment; therefore, he had to stay in Moscow, that is why he remained in the Organizational Department apparatus. This happened in 1932. When I came to the ECCI again in 1937, I was stunned by Alikhanov's enormous authority within the party organization and the leadership. I used to know him as a bad worker. Alikhanov artificially created an authority for himself. For example, we, the workers of the apparatus, never addressed the leading comrades [familiarlyl as ty, whereas he addressed both c. Moskvin and c. Manuilsky as ty.

Probably refers to F. Likhte (R. Vujović).

He thus created a specific atmosphere of intimacy. I think that he artificially created his authority.

I can speak about Alikhanov more than about anyone else. Mering and I took classes on Marxism with Alikhanov. There, Alikhanov had a fight with Furschik. Furschik used to be a Menshevik. It was not politically correct to defend a Menshevik, but in fact he had to be defended.

After the classes were over, Alikhanov went to Baku. He left at the same time as Lominadze did. During the elections he said nothing about this in his biography. He was asked about Baku, and he replied that he was removed for [engaging in] an unprincipled group squabble. I remember, during the purge, Solts asked him a question: Do you always exit with a squabble?

Alikhanov raised before the leadership the question of Borosh, Shenfeld, and Brann, about helping them.

Once there was a need to give information about Krajewski to the leadership. The information was written but did not go anywhere because Alikhanov said that to send such information would mean that Krajewski would have to be removed.

Chernin—when he was expelled from the party, I thought that he was a bad Communist, but I never imagined that he was an enemy. We expelled Chernomordik. I thought that if he deceived the party, he should not be a member of the party, but again, I did not think that he was an enemy. To some extent, we failed to follow com. Stalin's principles of political verification and a businesslike approach. Here we frequently went to an extreme. For example, the party committee resolved to expel Walecki from the party, yet the commission headed by c. Moskvin decided to remove him from the “Kommunisticheskii Internatsional” but to continue to use him. Facts from Krajewski's past were known. (Moskvin: They were known.) Someone knew about Midler's Trotskyism. (Moskvin: As soon as the leadership learned about it, we immediately called a meeting and worked out a line [to use] for that type). Alikhanov worked under c. Moskvin, and from there he transferred to the Cadres Department. I think that c. Moskvin should have known Alikhanov's biography, should have known that he was in Leningrad during the Leningrad opposition and later was removed for [participating in] an unprincipled group struggle in Baku. If you approached the issue more carefully, everything could have been investigated.

No. 1. VASILIEVA.

The whole leadership of the Cadres Department was in the enemy's hands. The problem of the selection of workers to the Cadres Department was not approached in a satisfactory manner. There was labor turnover; during the past three years, forty-five people passed through the Cadres Department. The filing is still in bad condition. Com. Blagoeva did little to help expose the shortcomings and fight them. On the contrary, she sharply reacted to criticism, coming down on those who criticized [her] by using her authority as a party leader and a member of the party committee. It happened to me, too. In our department, enemies worked in such a way as to concentrate all activities in their hands while removing from leadership such worthy workers as c. Gopner. The enemies in our department sought to put their work under their own control. Alikhanov opposed planning in work.

In her work, com. Blagoeva was closely connected with the enemies who were in the leadership of the department, and it prevented her from hearing the voice of the party members. I do not think that it is right to put Blagoeva on a par with the enemies, but she has to admit honestly that she, just like all of us, overlooked the enemy and cannot get off with general phrases.

MINGULIN. The party committee did not work well enough, but we know that Kotelnikov bore the bulk of work. In connection with the most recent events, our organization must draw conclusions for itself. Com. Moskvin was right when he said that the recent removals [of people] demonstrate that not everything is in order in our organization. It is essential to undertake a purge of all sectors of our organization.

Why did we overlook these enemies? We had people whom we knew as spotless, but after investigations, it turned out that they are not quite clean. There were signals, but we took them too lightly. Regarding some people, there were no indications at all. At this time, the organization faces the task of thoroughly investigating the political personality of each member of our organization, from the first to the last. Second, we have to thoroughly investigate each signal and to verify everything using all of the available documents. Third, we have to verify the work of each [member of the organization]. This is the conclusion we have to make.

We heard Blagoeva's and Tsirul's speeches, and what they actually said was that one enemy worked here, he was removed and exchanged for another, and that one for a third. And nobody noticed that they were enemies. It is impossible [to believe] that there was nothing subversive in their work. But the comrades are saying that secrecy made it impossible to detect everything. The party organization needs assurance that you will investigate this side of the issue.

Com. Moskvin spoke about familyness, and these comrades mentioned two people. Two people do not constitute familyness. This means that to fool people, familyness must have been much more serious. Why did the comrades from the Cadres Department not disclose the methods of familyness to which com. Moskvin referred?

We face the task of making our party organization and our apparatus healthy again. We should not simply throw people out, but it is essential to investigate each case to the end. […]

No. 5. ANGARETIS.

Why did the enemy find it so easy to work in our apparatus? Because many forget about real vigilance. Second, because many workers are working not as party members but as clerks. In the party group of the Propaganda Department, they investigated the case of Busch, whose father forged her party card and changed the date of her joining the party in order for her to be able to work in the CC CPG apparatus. And the party group in fact rehabilitated her, and party leader Zholdak attempted to gloss over the Busch case in the ICC. It was easy to expose her because she had left the USSR in 1929 as a Komsomol member and returned as a party member in 1928. Not just enemies but also other workers of the Cadres Department (Müller or others) art; responsible for not exposing her. Another thing, when L.

The 29 May 1937 resolution of the Fourth Moscow City Conference of the VKP read: “The Conference suggests that the Moscow city committee of the VKP work out measures to introduce Communists to the goals and aims, practice and techniques, of the sabotage, subversive, and espionage activities of the foreign espionage organs in order to teach every Communist how to precisely and promptly recognize and smash the enemies of the people.”

came, there was information that he was a traitor, but he nevertheless was admitted to the Congress. Who is responsible for that? He had to go through the credentials committee. After that, with the help of the enemies of the people Ortega [S. Pestkowski], Chernomordik, and others, he sneaked into the apparatus. His cast; was studied by the ICC to decide whether it was possible to let him remain in the apparatus. The ICC raised a question about his membership in the party, and he was expelled from the party. Where were the other workers of the Cadres Department who handled this person? They have to give an answer.

Recently I found materials composed by com. Yakuhovich, which lay idle for a long time and have not yet been sent to the NKVD. Such cases, when materials are not sent to the appropriate office, have to be revealed, and all those responsible have to give answers.

A number of enemies had not been arrested earlier because the Cadres Department failed to send materials that it possessed about these people? to the leadership. The problem is that there is no real vigilance, [only] a formal approach to work.

ROGOZHNIKOV.

Com. Angaretis told us what the workers of the Cadres Department should have told us, in particular what c. Blagoeva should tell us in her second speech, about the methods of the enemy in our organization. It is necessary to hold a political [information] day in accordance with the decision of the; Moscow party committee.

Refers to the centers of communications in the ECCI apparatus, most of which were located in the Moscow suburbs.

Com. Stalin said that it is essential to learn how io work from the rank and file, but Blagoeva did not pay attention to the workers' signals. Our leadership has to take that into account. I do not understand why they did not let Kotelnikov go to the centers.

This was not the only occasion on which Kotelnikov's political credentials were challenged. In June 1939 he penned two letters—one to Dimitrov and Manuilsky, the other to Dimitrov and Pugovkin in the CC—in which he defended himself against allegations that when he worked in the Eastern Secretariat, he had knowledge of Trotskyist conversations and activities there. For the letters, see f. 546, op. 1, d. 434, ll. 9–21.

Com. Kotelnikov cannot entrust that to others. How could the party committee have allowed workers from the centers not to be permitted to [attend] our general meetings? It is the party committee's fault. […]

Martynov wanted to accuse c. Tsirul of Trotskyism, basing [his accusations] only on c. Tsirul's speech.

(MARTYNOV FROM THE AUDIENCE: I do not consider Tsirul a Trotskyism but he defended Alikhanov. I have no other information, but during the elections to the party committee, c. Tsirul gave a positive reference to Alikhanov.)

(FROM THE AUDIENCE: Afonina also gave Chernomordik a positive reference when he was elected to the party committee.) […]

MOSKVIN.

It seems to me that the discussion has gone off in the wrong direction. We will have to return over and over again to the question of how the enemy penetrated us, especially since today we do not have a complete picture of the enemies' work. We will have to wait for the results of the ongoing investigation, which obliges us not to babble too much.

We are very weakly protected from external enemies. And I want to refer to a fact that com. Krylova told me about. The administrative decisions of the ECCI apparatus are already making their way to the fascist press. Consider this fact, and learn how to keep [your] mouths shut. Do not babble about what was discussed at the party meetings.

Each of us will have to talk about [his] mistakes in more detail. We need vigilance, not in words but in deeds. It is essential to put an end to this idiotic disease—carelessness. Lack of control and entrusting work [to others] facilitated the enemies' work.

At the closed meeting of the Secretariat, we thoroughly exposed the shortcomings and mistakes present in our work. We planned a series of practical measures in this regard. I repeatedly spoke about my blindness toward Müller. But it is not enough to talk. We have to mobilize ourselves and to work to rectify our mistakes. I think that the party committee will have to conduct the mobilization into this affair. Work discipline has deteriorated lately. It is necessary to improve it. For example, our papers are in terrible condition. God knows who has access to them. There is a certain sense of confusion among the workers of the apparatus. This is absolutely inadmissible, because panic will only favor the enemy. In order to unite ourselves in a Bolshevik way, it is essential to lead the whole apparatus on to the broad Bolshevik road.

Now about the discussion. There are reasons to criticize the party committee. We now have the right to demand more from it. But that does not mean that we can raise the question of dissolving the party committee. I spoke about familyness in the apparatus, the carriers of which were Alikhanov and Chernomordik. But it would be incorrect to heap the blame on others, for example, on com. Blagoeva. We cannot lump together those miscreants and honest comrades. We have to help Blagoeva to learn this lesson.

In his speech, com. Samsonov correctly pointed out several issues. He made clear that it was no accident that Alikhanov and Chernomordik tried to target the Administration of Affairs [Department], tried to attract attention to it. They wanted to distract attention from other sectors. However, Samsonov's idea that all party work revolves around these two issues is incorrect. Therefore, his originally correct idea became unconvincing. He did not keep a sense of proportion.

We have not felt the presence of the party committee lately. Rogozhnikov is right when he says that throughout the [Soviet] Union, the mobilization of party and non-party Bolsheviks to study methods to fight the enemy is under way, but we have failed to organize this. This [situation] has to be rectified quickly.

The Secretariat planned a series of measures to clean up the apparatus, in particular, the Communications Department. Com. Anvelt, who is currently reviewing the work of the Communications Department, is coming to the conclusion that the existing system impedes the [proper] development of work there.

I believe that the party committee will be up to its tasks, but all of us will have to help it. Each of you can come to the leadership to talk about the shortcomings that you notice in your work.

As for those who are leaving, it is important that they do not leave us as enemies. If they are not the enemies, why not use them in the publishing house, why not provide them with jobs? We decided to move some comrades to other departments, from one sector to another. But the attitude toward these comrades has to be friendly. It will be necessary to thoroughly purge the apparatus. By the way, the KIM helped us a lot with cadres.

Kotelnikov.

I agree with Samsonov that the party committee and I, when criticizing Samsonov, failed to expose even worse facts in the Communications Department and in the Cadres Department. It was our political mistake. However, one cannot agree with Samsonov when he says that it is necessary to liquidate Alikhanovschina [Alikhanov group]. The task of the whole party organization, including Samsonov, is to study, expose, and cleanse our party organization. Here the role of each individual party member has to be greater than [it has been] until now.

We talked here about familyness and mentioned Alikhanov and Chernomordik. It is a fact that Alikhanov and Chernomordik always supported each other at party committee meetings. On the Chernin question, Alikhanov defended his point of view; he was against expelling Chernin from the party. We expelled Chernin despite Alikhanov's resistance. In the case of Eisenberger, Alikhanov also offered resistance.

Alikhanov is an experienced enemy and double-dealer. He understood the situation in the organization well; he utilized every fact to deceive us.

During the exchange of party documents, Alikhanov concluded his speech by stating that [the members of] our entire organization, one and all, will come with new party cards. Did he not deceive the party organization when he raised a question about lifting the reprimand from Chernin? Alikhanov was an experienced enemy.

In its work the party committee has guided itself by the decisions of the CC [and] by the directives of the Moscow party committee and the district committee. We made mistakes. We failed to promptly expose these enemies.

There were voices here in favor of reelecting the party committee. It is the business of the party collective. It is difficult for me to discuss this because I am the party committee secretary. However, I think that we now need to strengthen the party committee. New comrades will help to overcome difficulties and shortcomings. If the general meeting agrees, we will raise the question in the district committee to let us supplement the party committee [with new members].

Political studies have weakened lately. The network of the party schools must be restructured. It may be necessary to replace some study group leaders. A series of comrades are retiring. It will be necessary to complete this work in the next few days.

You can blame the party committee for only now raising the issue of the arrest of several enemies in our apparatus. We did not raise it, not because we wanted to conceal it from the organization, [but rather] we did it in the interest of the cause. I do not think that a party crime was committed.

I suggest electing a commission that, together with the party activists and based on this discussion, will put together suggestions. Our collective will undertake the task of overcoming the current difficulties in a united, Bolshevik manner.

RESOLVED: To take the report into consideration. To charge the party committee, together with the party activists, to work out measures in connection with the lessons deriving from the latest arrests and removals from our organizations, to liquidate the results of sabotage and to further mobilize the organization to struggle against the remnants of the enemies' subversive activities. Second, [to work out measures] to mobilize the party organization to study Bolshevism. And third, to charge the party committee to suggest in the higher party organs of the Moscow organization that the election of additional members to the party committee be permitted.

TSIRUL.

Martynov accused me here of being a Trotskyist. I do not know what motivated him, but I request that if there are any reasons to accuse me of Trotskyism, they be investigated. If not, I request that this comrade be held responsible for this.

The majority in the party organization have known my work for several years. I was elected chairman of the purge commission, and there have never been any accusations against me. I am asking Martynov to state on what basis he called me a Trotskyist. He has no right to offend me, and the party meeting has to react to this. I have been struggling for the revolution for all these years and will not permit [him] to offend me.

As far I as understand it, Martynov referred to Tsirul's speech because when the meeting asked Martynov to repeat [his statement], he immediately rejected his formulation. Therefore, Martynov probably had no other basis for it except the speech by Tsirul.

I have never considered, and do not consider him a Trotskyist.

I see no reasons for passing any decision on this matter.

Martynov is not well educated, so he blurted [this] out.

I think that the party meeting will take into consideration Martynov's declaration that he had no reason to accuse Tsirul of Trotskyism. And second, the party meeting considers Martynov's statement irresponsible and not serious.

During the elections, Tsirul positively characterized Alikhanov; [he said] that he knew him well. I think that he then referred to him as a valuable worker. In this case, it is insincerity.

DEDKOV'S SUGGESTION IS PASSED.

I believe that no one deduced from c. Tsirul's speech that c. Tsirul is a Trotskyist.

A suggestion is made to compare the two speeches by c. Tsirul about Alikhanov: [the speech] at the time of electing Alikhanov to the party committee, and [the speech] at the present meeting.

(Suggestion passed.)

The party meeting should know the following fact: Kotelnikov and I have long been collecting and studying materials against Chernomordik. This fact must be taken into consideration in connection with the statement that Blagoeva joined this group. I also want to add that under the leadership of Kotelnikov, I initiated the request of materials from the Irkutsk organization that exposed Chernomordik, though too late.

Second note: com. Angaretis cited facts about the poor work of the Cadres Department. Comrades have to know that secrecy was treated as the most important principle, and I was unaware of the facts cited by com. Angaretis. The new leadership of the Cadres Department will have to study this question.

Third note: I think that the party organization heard from me how I evaluate my responsibility, my grave error of trusting, along with the whole party organization and the leadership, the enemy Alikhanov.

We will discuss the elections when we are able to summarize the results of the subversive work that the enemies conducted here. […]