The Ukhta-Pechora camp occupies a huge territory, with very limited means of communication and transportation, especially in its northern part. The sections of the camp are hundreds of kilometers away from the camp administration, which, given the difficulty of communications, especially in the winter, hampers the direct management of these sections (Vorkuta, Pechora, etc.)

For the most part, the Ukhtpechlag contingent of prisoners are extremely dangerous. Of the 54,947 total number of prisoners (as of 1 December 1937), there are 24,461 prisoners convicted of counterrevolution ary crimes:

In addition to that, the camp houses other categories of dangerous prisoners:

The large concentration of extremely dangerous state criminals in the camp required that the camp administration and the third department pay maximum attention to the issue of isolation and to organize a way of guarding prisoners that would be adequate for state security. In reality, the administration of the camp and its third department, having concentrated on production, followed the path of least resistance and forgot about the camp. As will become evident, issues concerning the camp as a place for the isolation of criminals were considered secondary in the Ukhtpechlag. Such an attitude toward camp problems had grave consequences.

First of all, almost everyone the entire camp (95–96 percent) has been left unescorted, which is unheard of in the camp system. Only confinement cells and certain teams or dangerous elements are guarded. Until October 1937 almost the entire camp had not been broken down into zones, and prisoners (especially in the summer) scattered at will after work without any control. Only now are some sections starting to create zones.

None of the camp sections practice daily morning roll calls and work assignments. This makes it difficult (and, in the large sections, extremely difficult) to figure out, after the work has started, who has escaped, how many people have reported to work, and how many refused to work, are sick, lack clothes, etc. Very importantly, none of the camp sections surveyed […] have even the most elementary isolation rules.

This situation has led to frequent escapes and a deterioration of discipline among the prisoners.

In 1937, those escaped from the Ukhtpechlag can be enumerated as follows:

I.e., almost 11 percent of the camp population have escaped. […]

Considering that there has not been even an elementary effort to improve isolation, the number of escapes should be considered “satisfactory,” because only the remote location of certain sections and lack of roads can explain why the entire camp has not yet escaped. […]

The third department of the Ukhtpechlag made no effort to prevent escapes. It is evident from the following data:

Thus, the escapees went unpunished. Moreover, among the 1,138 apprehended escapees from among the extremely dangerous contingent (Trotskyists, spies, subversives, etc.), only a few have been indicted. […]

In addition to the aforementioned shortcomings in escort practices, lack of discipline, etc., camp section heads permitted outrageous things to happen. For example, a top-secret operation plan to prevent escapes was posted in the courtyard of the 5th section office for everybody to see. Last November seven people escaped from Railway Team no. 13. The head of the camp, however, did not call for a search for one month, expecting them “to return.”

Remarkably, there is a “tradition” not to regard as escapes cases when prisoners move from one section of the camp to another, even though the sections are hundreds of kilometers apart.

The reference is to unauthorized relocation by prisoners.

[…]

In a situation where elementary rules of isolation are lacking, escort practices are not followed, zones are not established, and escapes are hardly curtailed, to strengthen the regimen and discipline in the camp is almost impossible. It is notable that the camp administration did not seriously and systematically deal with the issue of the camp regimen, and it was completely ignored in the camp sections. Characteristic of the entire camp is demoralization and a lack of discipline among prisoners, and, most notably, the disappearance of a boundary between even the extremely dangerous prisoners and free workers.

Until recently, in Kniazh-Pogost free workers were afraid to go around the camp after dark because of unrestrained robbery and banditry. Moreover, even the VOKhR guards walked at night with their arms drawn. […]

During the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of VChK-OGPU-NKVD organs, all free staff of the fifth department were brought into the zone because the ceremony was held in the club for prisoners. After the ceremony, prisoners—spies and subversives—danced with the wives of the VOKhR commanders and workers of the third department. It is possible to give more such facts. They are characteristic of the style of relations between free workers and prisoners (participation by the wives of free workers in plays with prisoners, etc.). It is important to note that free workers and prisoners quite commonly call each other “comrade” or by first name, even extremely dangerous state criminals.

As mentioned above, a lack of zones and escort practices has led to the effective disuse of isolation. After the NKVD directive to reinforce the regimen for the extremely dangerous contingent, in some camp sections (first, second, and third works), those convicted for espionage, subversion, terror, and other dangerous crimes have been moved into a zone. However, this produced no results, because the entrance to the zone remained unguarded and unattended. Therefore, the NKVD directive to escort the extremely dangerous contingent was not implemented.

In stationary camp sections (first, second, and third works, Kniazh-Pogost, etc.) the prisoners live in three–four apartment houses, where it is impossible to establish order, demand discipline, or, most important, exercise control. […]

The directive by the deputy people's commissar to remove extremely dangerous contingents from management positions is not followed. […]

The GULAG directive to discontinue joint living arrangements is not followed. For example, the spy Rodionov (railroad construction) lives together with his wife and child; prisoner Morozov, sentenced under article 35, lives with his wife, who was sentenced to ten years for treason; spies Orlov, Rozhik (second works) live with families, etc.

In some cases, camp managers ask to maintain joint living arrangements, even though this has no practical justification and, in the case of Ukhtpechlag, violates the interests of state security.

Notable is the extreme lack of discipline among prisoners: most of the prisoners did not stand up when the inspection commission visited their quarters. […]