Com. Stalin receives Sikorski in the presence of Com. V. M. Molotov.

After an exchange of mutual greetings, Sikorski, who arrived accompanied by Polish Ambassador Kot and the commander of Polish forces on USSR territory, General Anders, states that he has never been a supporter of the hostile policy toward the Soviet Union of certain circles in Poland. This gave him a moral right to sign the 30 July 1941 treaty with the USSR.

See doc. 94.

However, Sikorski would not like the slow implementation of the treaty to create difficulties for his [Stalin's] relations with the Poles.

The English translation of the Polish record reads: “I would not want that a slow realization of the agreement weaken the policy of approach and friendly coexistence between our two nations”; see DPSR, vol. I, no. 159, p. 232, lines 1-2.

He hopes that Com. Stalin will be of help in the implementation of this treaty so that minor shortcomings do not impede the development of Soviet-Polish relations. Sikorski is aware of the difficulties that the Soviet Union has had to endure while four-fifths of all Germany's land forces have been thrown into action against Russia. Sikorski was an advocate for the Soviet Union in London and America. Long ago he composed a memorandum urging the opening of a second front, which Com. Stalin spoke about in his own report of 6 November.

In a memorandum on the Eastern Front dated 20 July 1941, Sikorski wrote that a speedy Russian defeat would deprive the Allies of the benefits of Russia tying down considerable German forces in a Russo-German war. Therefore, he advised aid to Russia by a direct Allied attack on the Germans “now”; see Roman Wapiński, Wladyslaw Sikorski (Warsaw, 1978), p. 301. For Stalin's speech at the Moscow Soviet on 6 November 1941, see DVP, vol. XXIV, no. 271.

However, creating a second front is no easy matter. The creation of a second front must not lead to another Dakar.

The leader of the Free French Forces, General Charles de Gaulle, persuaded the British to launch an Anglo-French expedition to take the port city of Dakar, Senegal. However, on arriving there on 22 September 1941, it met with strong resistance by French forces loyal to Marshal Philippe Pétain and withdrew three days later.

Unfortunately, some of the measures that were supposed to be implemented in the USSR in accordance with the Soviet-Polish treaty have yet to be implemented. Many Poles are still in prisons and camps, where they are losing their strength and health instead of serving our common cause. Sikorski and the Polish ambassador cannot produce exact lists of these individuals, but the heads of the concentration camps have these lists in their possession.

Com. Stalin replies that all Poles who were imprisoned have been released under the amnesty. A few of them may have run away somewhere before liberation, to Manchuria, for example.

Manchuria, part of northern China plus part of Inner Mongolia, had been a puppet state under Japanese occupation since 1932; its Japanese name was Manchukuo.

I would like, says Com. Stalin, for Mr. Sikorski to enjoy full confidence that we do not have any intention of detaining even one Pole. We have released all of them, even those who came to the USSR with sabotage assignments from General Sosnkowski.

General Kazimierz Sosnkowski was the minister in the Polish government-in-exile in charge of the resistance in Poland, but he resigned to protest the lack of Soviet recognition of the prewar Polish-Soviet frontier in the Sikorski-Maisky agreement of 30 July 1941. By “sabotage assignments” Stalin probably had in mind the Polish underground in western Ukraine in 1939-1941, which was infiltrated and then destroyed by the NKVD; see the bilingual Polish-Russian documentary collection on the Polish underground there, in Polskie Podziemie na Terenach Zachodniej Ukrainy i Zachodniej Bialorusi w Latach 1939-1941 / Polskoe Podoplie na Territorii Zapadnoi Ukrainy i Zapadnoi Belorussii 1939-1941 gg. [The Polish Underground in the Territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, 1939-1941], 3 vols., ed. Wiktor Komogorow et al. (Warsaw and Moscow, 2001-2004). There also is a Polish-Ukrainian publication on the Polish underground: Polskie Podziemie 1939-1941 / Polske Pidpillia 1939-1941, 3 vols., ed. Zuzanna Gajowniczek, Grzegorz Jakubowski et al. (Warsaw and Kiev, 1998-2004).

Com. Molotov says that only those Poles convicted on criminal charges remain imprisoned.

Com. Stalin adds that early in the war we arrested several Poles whom the Germans had smuggled in with radios for purposes of espionage.

These Poles are unknown. The possession of radio transmitters without a permit was a crime under Soviet criminal law. People caught with them were charged with espionage.

Indeed, the Polish government is not demanding their release.

Sikorski and Kot reply that the Polish government is not defending such individuals. However, Kot points out, many Polish patriots remain imprisoned.

Sikorski says that the publication of an appeal to Soviet officials and the Soviet population to treat the Poles better would bring great benefit.

Com. Stalin replies that the Soviet population does treat the Poles well.

Sikorski replies that he was witness in Kuibyshev to the sorry plight of one transport of Poles.

Sikorski was referring to Polish military personnel and civilians freed from the camps who often traveled in unheated railway cattle cars without food to recruitment centers and to the Polish Embassy in Kuibyshev (Samara). Some arrived frozen to death, and many were starving.

The population treats the Poles well, but the representatives of the local administration often treat them badly. The Polish government would like to divide the [civilian] Poles in the USSR into two groups. The first group would include those who can and should work. However, these people must work in their own trades. It is bad if a Polish tank specialist is forced to work as a woodcutter. There have been instances when outstanding Polish chemists have been doing physical labor. Many of these individuals could be left where they are settled, while others should be settled in regions with a warmer climate. They could work under the same conditions as Soviet citizens. The second group would include those who cannot work, that is, children, old people, and invalids. They require material assistance. In addition, representatives of the Polish Embassy must have the right to go where Poles have been assembled and render assistance to the Polish population there. The Polish Embassy would also like to have its own representative in Vladivostok to receive transports [of supplies] arriving for Poles from America.

Aid packages for Poles interned in the USSR, sent by Polish-American relief organizations to the Polish Embassy, Kuibyshev, and the Polish Red Cross in USSR, were shipped to the far eastern Russian port city of Vladivostok. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, these supplies were sent mostly through Britain to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. For a list of various supplies (in kilograms) received between 5 December 1941 and 1 November 1942, see Beria's note to Stalin, 15 January 1943, on Polish citizens in the USSR, in KD2/184; KDZ3/242.

Com. Stalin replies that the amnesty in this country was universal. A few Poles released from the camps may not have been able to leave owing to transportation difficulties. At the present time there are no Poles in prisons, in camps, or in exile except for criminals or those linked with the Germans.

General Anders says that at the present time there are also unliberated Poles in the camps. Individuals who have been released from the camps come to see him all the time and tell him that many Poles remain in the camps.

Com. Molotov notes that if the Poles are coming to see him, then they have been released.

Anders says that the heads of the camps are gradually releasing Poles, and many Poles are still imprisoned. The problem is that releasing the Poles would undermine the work plans of the camp commanders.

This applied particularly to Soviet forest-clearing camps. Mikhail Saltykov, deputy commissar for the Soviet Forest Industry, wrote Vasily Chernyshov on 24 September 1941 requesting that he speed up the delivery of 80,000 POWs to work in forest clearing; see KDZ3/205.

Therefore, the camp commanders prefer not to release the Poles. Anders hands Com. Stalin a list of Poles who, according to his information, are still in the camps.

According to the Polish record, Sikorski handed Stalin a list of 4,000 officers still held in prisons and labor camps. He said the list was incomplete because it was made from memory; see Anders, Bez Ostatniego Rozdzialu, p. 89; Anders, An Army in Exile, p. 85; and DPSR, vol. I, no. 159, p. 233.

Com. Stalin promises to look into this matter once more and to put the matter to rights. As for the question of giving [Soviet] officials instructions to treat the Poles better and the suggestion that Polish specialists be able to work in their own trades and professions, we will do this. We can also give agents of the Polish ambassador the opportunity to carry out the specified work with the Polish population. Com. Stalin directs Sikorski's attention to the difficulties of transportation for the Poles. Right now the Germans have occupied our regions with a more developed railway network. In the eastern regions of the Soviet Union, the railway network is less developed, and this creates difficulties in transporting Poles. Sikorski must realize that it is necessity rather than any ill will that is to blame for these difficulties. Now the situation will be improving gradually, since the evacuation period is over: the evacuation of seventy factories, including aircraft and machine-building plants, is complete.

Com. Molotov adds that at the present time a regulation concerning local representatives of the Polish Embassy is being worked out. This regulation is being coordinated between the Polish Embassy and the Narkomindel [People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs].

See “Rules Regulating the Scope of Activities of Delegates of the Polish Embassy Drawn Up in Consultation with Representatives of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Kuibyshev, 23 December 1941,” Dokymenty i Materialy, vol. VII, no. 178 (Russian text); DPSR, vol. I, no. 166 (English translation of Polish text). The Polish Embassy was allowed to name about 120 delegates to find and help Poles in various parts of the USSR.

Kot says that those Poles who are being released in the Far East could be settled somewhere in the Altai region and not necessarily be transferred to southern regions.

Com. Stalin says that the region of Alma-Ata and the regions of southern Kazakhstan could be designated for the settlement of Poles.

Anders expresses his wish that the Poles be settled in the Fergana region [Farghona, Uzbekistan].

Com. Stalin explains that Fergana is a region where we import wheat; the land there is planted in cotton. Therefore, we need to stipulate the settlement of Poles in regions that produce ample grain.

Com. Stalin points on the map to those regions where the Poles could be settled.

Sikorski gives his consent to settling the Poles in these regions. Sikorski and Kot say that they want the Poles to help fight Germany, not die in vain in the north.

“We want the same thing,” replies Com. Stalin. “We are in favor of friendship with the Poles and a joint struggle against Germany. Enough of all the hostility between the Poles and Russians! History dictates to us the necessity of an alliance of the Slavic nations.”

Sikorski goes on to say that it would be desirable to obtain an assistance loan for the Polish population. According to Sikorski, 100 million rubles would fully satisfy the Polish government.

Com. Stalin replies that this can be done.

On this and other Polish-Soviet financial agreements, see note 192.

Com. Stalin asks whether the Poles have any other questions regarding the Polish civilian population in the USSR and, receiving a negative answer, proposes moving on to survey military issues.

Sikorski states that the Poles want to conduct a real rather than a token war against the Germans.

“Where, in the colonies?” asks Com. Stalin.

Sikorski replies that the Polish Army wants to fight on the continent for the liberation of Poland. At the present time, Poles on German-occupied territory are engaged in anti-German sabotage. At the appropriate moment, there will be an uprising in Poland.

The Armia Krajowa in German Poland was to stage an uprising when the Germans were retreating. In the meantime, it conducted sabotage and limited armed actions; see the account of General Tadeusz Bör-Komorowski, AK commander in chief, 1943-1944, in his Secret Army (New York, 1950); and, in Polish, his Armia Podziemna (London, 1950; 5th edition, 1985); see also the book by the head of civilian resistance and the last government delegate in Poland, Stefan Korboński: The Polish Underground: A Guide to the Underground, 1939-1945, trans. Marta Erdman (New York, 1978).

A million and a half Poles have been deported to Germany. The Polish government is in constant communication with them. These Poles have already created quite a bit of trouble for the Germans, for example, in the metallurgical industry in Westphalia. Moreover, the Poles have facilitated an outbreak of epidemics in Germany by spreading bacteria.

Poles were deported to forced labor in Germany. Poles had worked in Westphalia and the Ruhr since the second half of the nineteenth century. A doctor in the resistance in German Poland produced typhoid bacteria, but it is not known whether they led to any epidemic outbreaks in Germany.

Sikorski is reporting this information in complete confidentiality. He has not even told Churchill about the spreading of bacteria, since the English are very sentimental and would not understand this.

Com. Stalin remarks jokingly that if Sikorski tried to tell the English about this, there would be a report about it in the English press the next day.

“Besides,” says Sikorski, “we have a corps of our own troops in England.”

“How many divisions?” asks Com. Stalin.

“One division, three brigades, and one officers' brigade,” replies Sikorski. “There are many Polish officers in England but not enough soldiers. Moreover, we have nineteen air squadrons there.”

By the officers' brigade, Sikorski probably meant the detached Polish Parachute Brigade formed to support the planned uprising against the Germans; see KDZ3/221, n. 3.

Com. Stalin asks how many planes there are in a Polish air squadron.

“Twenty-seven planes,” replies Sikorski. “Polish pilots have fought well against the Germans, and 20 percent of all the planes knocked out by the English Air Force can be racked up to Polish pilots.”

Polish pilots contributed significantly to the British victory over the Germans in the Battle of Britain; see Lynne Olson and Stanley Cloud, A Question of Honor: The Kościuszko Squadron: Forgotten Heroes of World War II (New York, 2003); and Adam Zamoyski, The Forgotten Few: The Polish Air Force in the Second World War (New York, 1995).

Sikorski emphasizes that he is speaking about these affairs as a military man and has no plans for making political use of this.

“When men fight well—that's the best politics,” says Comrade Stalin.

Moreover, continues Sikorski, there is one independent Polish brigade in Tobruk.

The Polish Carpathian Brigade, formed in Syria in 1939 from soldiers escaping west through the Balkans, was initially part of the French Army. After the fall of France, it served with the British Army. In September 1941 it was shipped from Egypt to Tobruk. The battle for Tobruk was in its first phase during Sikorski's visit to Moscow; see Steven J. Zaloga and Richard Hook, The Polish Army, 1939-45, Men-at-Arms Series, no. 117 (London, 1982; New York, 1996), p. 18.

After the liberation of Tobruk it will be transferred to Syria, where it will be motorized and acquire two tank battalions. The Polish government has several battleships in the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.

See Michael Alfred Peszke, Poland's Navy, 1918-1945 (New York, 1999).

The Polish government also has military units and large manpower reserves in the USSR. The Poles in the USSR are the sole manpower reserve of the Polish government. If the treaty with the USSR is properly implemented, then the Poles can form eight divisions in the USSR, in addition to supplemental units for corps and divisions. Polish troops in England will compose the vanguard of the English landing force in the event of the formation of a second front in Europe or else will be transferred to the USSR in order, together with the other Polish troops, to participate in the fight against Germany. In that case, Sikorski himself would come to the USSR to lead the Polish troops.

Sikorski expresses his concern over the fact that Polish divisions in the USSR are being formed under very difficult conditions that make it impossible to create a good army. The war could go on for a long time. As it unfolds, the moment nears when the Poles will be able to get a large quantity of military hardware from England and the United States. The English government has assured the Poles that they can get arms and food in England as long as the Polish troops are situated in proximity to English bases.

Anders says that his troops, about 40,000 men, are now in very difficult conditions. So far two divisions have been formed.

“How many artillery battalions do you have?” asks Com. Stalin. [Anders:] “I have two battalions altogether, with one battery per regiment.”

Com. Stalin says that the Poles started the war with the Germans with divisions of 15,000, which included two artillery regiments apiece: one cannon regiment and a howitzer regiment. Such a division proved unwieldy. The howitzers were left behind. [Now] the enemy has no fortifications, so there is less need for the howitzers. The division is lighter. Our military also believe that the division ought to be lighter, so right now our divisions do not have enough artillery. We are reinforcing our divisions with antitank artillery, mortars, and antitank rifles. In this way, the modern division has from 11,600 to 12,000 men.

Anders says he believes that Polish divisions need to be formed on the basis of the same calculation.

Sikorski says that at the present time they have armaments for one division in the USSR. The second division has not been armed. Moreover, the Polish divisions are situated in locations with a very severe climate. Right now it is 33 degrees below zero [Celsius], and the Polish soldiers have to live in tents.

Thirty-three degrees below zero Celsius equals minus 25 degrees Fahrenheit. The Polish Army headquarters were located in Buzuluk, about 150 miles southeast of Kuibyshev. The other areas of concentration were in nearby Tatishchev and Totskoe.

Sikorski is worried that they will die without making any contribution to the war against Germany. He has spoken with Churchill about moving the camp somewhere else—for example, Iran—where these divisions could be completed and in four months return to the USSR, possibly accompanied by English troops, and be transferred to a specific sector of the German-Soviet front to fight alongside the Red Army.

Com. Stalin remarks that the army that goes to Iran will never come back.

“Why?” asks Sikorski.

“England has a lot of work to do on the fronts,” says Com. Stalin.

“We have work to do here,” replies Anders.

Com. Stalin says that later the English will say, “We equipped you; therefore you have to work for us.”

Sikorski states that the Polish government disposes of its own army independently. It could return the troops that are transferred to Iran to the USSR and might add to them the brigade now in Tobruk.

Kot adds that the Poles fight better when they are closer to Poland.

“Iran is not close to Poland,” says Com. Stalin.

Sikorski states that England today is not what it was when he, Sikorski, saw it in 1940. Now the English have a great number of troops.

Com. Molotov says that as he understands it, the difficulties of forming the units in the USSR make it necessary, in the opinion of the Polish government, to move the Polish troops from the USSR to Iran.

Anders replies in the affirmative and says that they have not received a single building fit for residence, nor lumber to build barracks. There are no stables. The horses are in very bad shape. They [Polish Army] can't build schools.

Schools are not mentioned in the Polish record, but it is known that Anders wanted to build officers' training schools, and they were established. After leaving the USSR in summer-fall 1942, Anders also set up schools for the children of military families in Iran and, later, in the Middle East.

Food is supplied in inadequate quantities.

Sikorski states that he knows Churchill and is confident that he will not make difficulties over the issue of bringing Polish units back to the USSR from Iran. An agreement could be signed to this effect that Churchill, too, would sign.

Com. Stalin points out that we cannot force the Poles to fight. There can be no talk of a treaty. If the Poles don't want to [fight], then we will make do with our own divisions.

Com. Molotov asks what needs to be done in practical terms to improve conditions for the formation of Polish units.

Anders again refers to the cold, to the fact that he is not getting boards for construction, tractors for moving building materials, and so on.

“We aren't going to haggle!” says Com. Stalin. “If the Poles want to fight closer to their own territory, then let them stay with us. If they don't, we can't demand this of them. If it's to be Iran, then let it be Iran. Go ahead! I am sixty-two years old,” continues Com. Stalin, “and I have the life experience that tells me that an army is going to fight wherever it is formed.”

Sikorski says that they could form the army in Iran under better conditions than in the USSR.

“We won't make difficulties,” says Com. Stalin.

Sikorski states that he is not posing this question as an ultimatum. Perhaps there is another region in the USSR where the Polish Army could be formed under better conditions. Unfortunately, it cannot be formed where it is now.

Com. Stalin replies that we do have different climatic zones, but that is not the point. After all, the Poles are not from warm countries either!

Anders replies that in Poland there is never the kind of freezing cold that there is in the USSR. Moreover, the Polish Army includes men from various regions of Poland, including southern regions. At the present time, the Polish Army is simply fighting to survive and not preparing to fight on the fronts.

Sikorski adds that if the Polish Army is not trained, then it will have a hard time fighting at the front. Sikorski says that he was a little stung by Com. Stalin's comment that the Poles don't want to fight.

“I am a bit crude and no diplomat,” says Com. Stalin. “I'm putting the question bluntly: Do the Poles want to fight?”

“They do,” replies Sikorski.

Com. Stalin points out that probably not all the Poles will go to Iran; some will stay behind.

Com. Molotov asks how the Poles who stay in the USSR will react to the fact that the Polish Army has gone to Iran.

Anders says that the Poles will return from Iran to fight the Germans. He, Anders, is firmly convinced that air and naval operations alone cannot lead to victory over Germany. The bayonet will take Berlin.

Com. Stalin says that the Poles can get armaments more quickly from us than from the English. “I know,” says Com. Stalin, “what sea shipments mean.”

Anders says that in the USSR the Poles could form an army of 150,000 men, which would mean eight divisions. The pilots would be sent to England to return to the Polish Army in the USSR with the planes. Moreover, there are another eight armored battalions, which at present are felling trees for the camps of the Polish Army.

Com. Stalin reminds the general that the Poles themselves refused to form air and armored units in the USSR.

Anders admits that he did not raise the issue of tanks and aviation during the [negotiations for the] conclusion of the military agreement.

For the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement of 14 August 1941, see doc. 95 and its notes.

He, Anders, by the way, thought it acceptable to shift the Polish armies to the south so that they could get their food via the auto route between Mashad [northeast Iran] and Ashkhabad [Ashgabat, southeast Turkmenistan, on the Iranian-Soviet frontier]. There are many drivers in the Polish Army who could serve in the motor columns.

Com. Stalin says that the Red Army divisions are well dressed and well fed. A large number of men from the south serve in them, but they are not complaining about the climate as the Poles are.

Anders replies that his divisions are not receiving the same [supplies] as Red Army units. They are not getting what they are supposed to. They have absolutely no potatoes, and they are not receiving any vegetables. There are great interruptions in the food supply in general. The soldiers are living in tents and dugouts. The stables are made out of brushwood.

“Do as you wish,” says Com. Stalin. “If it's to be Iran, then let it be Iran.”

Sikorski says that he did not wish to put the issue so harshly, but would prefer to find a solution in full accord with Com. Stalin.

“I understand,” says Com. Stalin. “England needs the Polish troops. England is our ally, so go ahead!”

Sikorski says he is confident that not only Polish but also English divisions would come together from Iran to the USSR. Sikorski is ready to put this question to Churchill. Churchill has assured him that English units are ready to move to a sector of the Russian front. The Polish Army in England is in an independent position. If Sikorski wants to move the Polish troops here from England, he is confident that he could do so without any objections on the part of the English. Only a few Polish airmen in England would remain there, those who are in English units.

Com. Stalin says that he is not against Polish units fighting alongside English troops. Com. Stalin asks what will happen to the Soviet-Polish treaty if the Polish Army goes to Iran? This could not be concealed, and the treaty would collapse.

Anders says that the war against the Germans will continue anyway, so he doesn't see why the treaty should collapse.

“This is a platonic war,” says Com. Stalin, and [he] points out that the Polish divisions in the USSR will be able to fight on the front in a month or two. “Right now there are two Polish divisions, a third can be formed, and then we will have a Polish corps.”

Anders points out that he has many untrained soldiers.

“But you do have reservists,” says Com. Stalin.

“Reservists make up 60 percent of my forces,” replies Anders.

“You have 60 percent reservists and you have decided that nothing can be done. You weren't given boards and you think all is lost! We will take Poland and turn it over to you in half a year. We have enough troops, we can manage without you. But what will people say when they find out? And the Polish troops that will be in Iran are going to have to fight wherever the English want.”

“Where will they have to fight?” asks Anders.

“Defend Turkey from the Germans,” replies Com. Stalin. “Maybe the English will need troops in North Africa, or in half a year Japan will enter [the war] and then the Poles may be sent to Singapore.”

“Organize a corps here,” continues Com. Stalin, “so that people don't start laughing, and you can shift the rest to Iran. Do you want a place and supplies for seven divisions? If you want to send your troops to Iran, send them, but it would be good for you and for the common cause to form three divisions here. The rest you can send to Iran, if England needs troops. Before long, we ourselves are going to help it out with troops.”

Sikorski says that the English are slow to act, but now they are not the same as before. If Com. Stalin can find a place to form Polish divisions in the USSR, then the issue of moving them does not have to be raised, other than transferring Poles to England to reinforce air units [there].

Summoned by Com. Stalin, Major General [Aleksei P.] Panfilov, the General Staff plenipotentiary for forming the Polish Army on the territory of the USSR, enters the study where the conversation is taking place.

Com. Stalin tells him the Poles are complaining that we are not feeding their soldiers, or giving them shoes or clothing, and are keeping them in the cold.

Com. Panfilov replies that the supplying of Polish units is proceeding normally and that recently they were also given stoves.

“Do our troops live any better?” asks Com. Stalin.

Com. Panfilov replies that our troops live no better. If the Polish troops are experiencing shortages in supplies, then General Anders is to blame for not informing Com. Panfilov of this. So far the Polish Army has been given food rations for 30,000, but the army has grown, and after a while they started being given more, but then the supply was cut back to 30,000.

See the SNK resolution “On the Polish Army on the USSR Territory,” 3 November 1941, setting the number at 30,000 men; see KD2/173; KDZ3/211, first published in Materski, Polscy Jeńcy Wojenni, no. 12, pp. 95-96; Materski, Kremlin versus Poland, no. 3, pp. 27-28. For Panfilov to Anders, 6 November 1941, on limiting the Polish Army to 30,000 men, see SSSR i Polsha, chap. I, no. 20, pp. 46-47; and DPSR, vol. I, no. 140, pp. 197-198 (English translation).

Com. Stalin says that after his conversation with the Polish ambassador the former supplies were restored. The same day he gave instructions to restore the former rate of supply.

In the Stalin-Kot conversation of 14 November 1941, Stalin mentioned Soviet difficulties and shortages but said the situation should improve in three months. He also said he had no objection to even seven Polish divisions, provided the Poles themselves supplied the arms and the food for them; see DVP, vol. XXIV, no. 282, p. 423 (Russian); KDZ3/212 (Polish translation); Kot, Listy z Rosji, no. 49, pp. 169-180 (Polish record); Kot, Conversations with the Kremlin, no. B13, pp. 106-116; and DPSR, vol. I, no. 149 (English translation of Polish record).

Anders points out that the former rate of supply for his troops was not restored.

“Why?” Com. Stalin asks Com. Panfilov.

Com. Panfilov replies that instructions to restore the former number of rations were given by General [Andrei V.] Khrulev.

“They need rations, not instructions,” says Com. Stalin.

“Why have the rations been held up?” asks Com. Molotov.

“After all, men live on bread, not instructions!” adds Com. Stalin.

Sikorski says that he did not want to raise the question of taking his troops out of the USSR, but after he saw that their formation was proceeding under such difficult conditions, he raised the question.

Com. Stalin says that he is posing the question once again, honestly and bluntly: If it will be better for the Polish troops in Iran, then let them go to Iran. If the Polish troops want to form up and live in the same conditions as ours, then they can form three to five divisions. Our army has better uniforms and food than the German Army. The Red Army lives better than the German Army does. We can ensure that the Polish Army will have the same conditions as the Red Army.

Anders replies that if he got for his men and horses what they get in the Red Army, he would be quite satisfied.

“You will get that,” Com. Stalin says.

Sikorski says a warmer place has to be found and [then] the Polish Army can be formed. His suggestion to move the troops to Iran was prompted only by his desire to get his army ready to fight as quickly as possible.

Com. Stalin says it seemed to him that the whole point was that the English needed troops.

“We want to fight on the continent,” Anders declares. “We will stick the bayonet into Berlin.”

Com. Stalin says the Russians have been in Berlin twice, and they will be there a third time.

The Russians burned down Berlin in 1760 and passed through it in 1813.

Anders replies that the Poles have never been in Berlin, but they have been at Grunwald.

Com. Stalin reminds him that the Battle of Grunwald took place in the fifteenth century.

On 15 July 1410 the Polish-Lithuanian armies defeated the Teutonic Knights at the Battle of Grunwald (German, Tannenberg).

Anders confirms this and expresses admiration for Com. Stalin's memory.

Sikorski goes on to say that many Poles have been sent to Uzbekistan to form new units, but the conditions there are difficult.

The NKVD was forcibly assigning many Poles released from labor camps in northern Russia to state and collective farms in Uzbekistan.

Com. Stalin instructs Major General Panfilov to find barracks for the Polish troops. This will require closing several schools.

Anders says that the Poles can form eight divisions, plus the corps and auxiliary troops, for a total of 150,000 men.

Com. Stalin asks Anders whether he is not being overly enthusiastic: 150,000 is a very large number. Maybe such a number of Poles want to join the army, but not all of them may want to fight. Maybe some want to join the army just to get fed. They reason thus: “The war will probably be over before we get moved to the front, and in the meantime we will be sure to get fed.”

Sikorski says that there may be men like that, but most likely they are Jews.

Com. Stalin says Jews aren't the only ones who can reason like this. As far as Jews are concerned, they are poor fighters.

Anders says he had some Jews who were only in the army to get fed, but they have already run away: 350 of them ran away after [hearing of] an air raid on Kuibyshev, which did not take place.

The English translation of the Polish record has Anders saying: “Two hundred Jews deserted from Buzuluk [Polish Army headquarters at this time] upon hearing the false report on the bombing of Kuibyshev”; see DPSR, vol. I, p. 241; see also Kot, Conversations with the Kremlin, p. 153. Many Jews deserted the Polish Army when it was stationed in Palestine to fight for a Jewish homeland, but those who remained fought bravely in the Anders-led Polish 2nd Corps in Italy.

Com. Stalin asks what armaments Polish troops have been given in the USSR.

Com. Panfilov hands Com. Stalin a list of what Polish troops in the USSR have and have not received. Essentially everything has been provided, Com. Panfilov says. They received more mortars, shells, and grenade throwers than warranted by the size of their military organization. The Poles had no antitank or antiaircraft artillery except for four cannon.

Sikorski asks Com. Stalin about the new locations for the formation of the Polish Army.

Com. Stalin asks whether the Poles would object to forming the army in several locations.

On receiving a negative reply, Com. Stalin points out that Central Asia —Uzbekistan, maybe Turkmenistan, and maybe Transcaucasia—could serve as locations.

The Polish Army headquarters was moved in January-February 1942 to Yangi Yul, near Tashkent, Uzbekistan, near the Iranian border. Many Poles suffered from malnutrition and disease; many died of malaria or typhoid fever.

Sikorski asks how many divisions can be raised.

Com. Stalin points out that the Red Army does not have corps in it anymore. We have found corps command levels to be a hindrance, so now our divisions are only grouped in armies. Com. Stalin asks whether the Poles want to raise seven divisions. We can equip them just like the Red Army. We will equip them partly on our own and partly they will be [equipped by] the English and the Americans.

Anders says they can raise an army without corps formations.

Sikorski states he will take measures to obtain armaments from America and England.

Com. Stalin remarks that sea transportation is rather difficult, and convoys can be late. Much can happen at sea.

Sikorski says the Poles will form seven divisions. They will transfer their airmen to England. Sikorski asks whether the Soviet Union needs airmen.

Com. Stalin says we are now on a par with the Germans with respect to their air force on our front. In some places we have superiority. Our aircraft are not bad. We are short of tanks.

Sikorski says that a large part of the German Air Force has been shifted to Africa.

“That could be,” Com. Stalin replies. “We can tell that the German Air Force is now weaker. Their pilots are bad and their planes somewhat old. The Germans have no fighter planes that can go 580 kilometers an hour or bombers with speeds over 500 kilometers per hour. Their famous Junkers plane can only go 460 kilometers per hour. Moreover, the Germans have very little cannon power on their aircraft.”

Sikorski says that he, too, considers the Soviet Air Force very strong. You cannot compare the air defenses of Moscow and London. Moscow is much better protected than London and the damage in Moscow is minor.

Com. Stalin says that the English are good pilots. They fought well at Murmansk, where they had their fighter planes. “The English pilots are great boys,” Com. Stalin says.

The quotation marks were supplied by A. M. Cienciala. An English fighter squadron was stationed at Murmansk to protect supply ships coming from Britain against German attacks.

Sikorski praises Soviet pilots. They are famous for their skill and courage.

Com. Stalin says he believes the Slavs are the bravest of all European peoples. Besides this, they are quick to learn everything. They are young nations, not yet worn out by life in the slums.

Anders says the Slavs are not like the French.

Com. Stalin says the French are a good people, but their rulers have been bad. The French are a capable people. The Germans have managed to make the Slavs their enemies. The Slavs are going to beat the Germans. This is not what Hitler wanted.

Sikorski says this is also his view.

Sikorski then says he would like to visit the places where Polish troops are forming, also where Poles are concentrated in the USSR, and then fly back to Moscow for a concluding conversation with Com. Stalin.

“I am at your service,” replies Com. Stalin.

In a conversation between Stalin and Sikorski at the banquet held the next day, 4 December 1941, Stalin proposed that they settle the frontier question by themselves, before the peace conference. Sikorski said the 1939 frontier could not be questioned, but asked to return to the problem later, a proposal Stalin welcomed; see DPSR, vol. I, no. 160, pp. 244-245; Anders, Bez Ostatniego Rozdzialu, p. 102; Anders, An Army in Exile, p. 89. Sikorski, however, did not fly back to the Soviet capital after his visit to the Polish troops. He did not meet with Stalin again.

Sikorski expresses his desire to go on the air tomorrow and broadcast a declaration on behalf of the governments of all the occupied countries. He gave the text of the declaration to Com. Vyshinsky in Kuibyshev.

Com. Stalin replies that he has read the declaration and that it would be very good for Sikorski to read it over the radio.

Sikorski asks for London to be informed of the time of the broadcast so that the declaration can be transmitted from there in other languages.

Com. Stalin says the declaration will be translated in Moscow into twenty-four languages and broadcast from Moscow.

For the Polish text of Sikorski's radio speech to the Polish people from Moscow on 4 December 1941, see Dokumenty i Materialy, vol. VII, no. 170; an excerpt in English translation is in DPSR, vol. I, no. 162.

Sikorski hands Com. Stalin a written draft of the Soviet-Polish declaration. Com. Stalin can decide whether or not such a declaration is needed. Sikorski believes this declaration will make a favorable impression on America.

Com. Stalin takes the draft declaration and promises to read it and give his comments tomorrow.

This was the Polish-Soviet Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, signed in Moscow by Sikorski and Stalin on 4 December 1941; for the Polish text, see Dokumenty i Materialy, vol. VII, no. 169; for an English translation, see DPSR, vol. I, no. 161; for the Russian text, see DVP, vol. XXIV, no. 310, p. 479.

In conclusion, Com. Stalin and Sikorski agree that General Anders and General Panfilov will meet tomorrow to discuss the details of the formation of Polish units.

See Protocol no. 8 of the Joint [Soviet-Polish] Commission for the Formation of the Polish Army on the Territory of the USSR. It assumed the formation of six to seven Polish infantry divisions, of which four would be formed in the Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Turkmen Soviet Republics; see SSSR i Polsha, chap. I, no. 22, pp. 51-52. On 25 December 1941 the State Defense Committee resolved that the Polish Army in the USSR would number 96,000 men; see KD2/177; KDZ3/223, first published in Materski, Armia Polska, no. 3. The next day, 26 December 1941, the commander of the Red Army's Rear Services, General Andrei Khrulev, issued a directive on supplying the 96,000-man Polish Army; see SSSR i Polsha, chap. I, no. 26, pp. 56-58.

The conversation took place in the study of Comrade V. M. Molotov in the [building of the] USSR SNK, lasted two hours and thirty minutes, and was conducted in the Polish language. General Anders translated.

Recorded by Podtserob

Boris Podtserob (1910-1983) worked at this time in the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs; see KD2/176, n. 6.