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Stalin to Molotov, Rykov, Bukharin, and other friends

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By Dzhugashvili, Iosif Vissarionovich (Stalin)

Stalin's Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936

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Letter 21

[25 June 1926]

Sochi, 6/25/26 To Molotov, Rykov, Bukharin, and other friends,

I have long pondered the matter of the Lashevich affair, going back and forth, linking it with the question of the opposition groups in general; several times I came to various opinions and have finally settled on the following: 1) Before the appearance of the Zinoviev group, those with oppositional tendencies (Trotsky, the workers' opposition, and others) behaved more or less loyally and were more or less tolerable; 2) With the appearance of the Zinoviev group, those with oppositional tendencies began to grow arrogant and break the bounds of loyalty; 3) The Zinoviev group became the mentor of everyone in the opposition who was for splitting the party; in effect it has become the leader of the splitting tendencies in the party; 4) This role fell to Zinoviev's group because a) it is better acquainted with our methods than any other group, b) it is stronger in general than the other groups and has control of the Comintern Executive Committee ([Zinoviev is] chairman of the Comintern Executive Committee), which represents a serious force; c) because of this it behaves more arrogantly than any other group, providing examples of “boldness” and “determination” to those with other tendencies; 5) Therefore the Zinoviev group is now the most harmful, and the blow must be struck precisely against this group at the plenum;

A statement from thirteen members of the plenum (I. Avdeev, I. Bakaev, L. Kamenev, N. Krupskaia, M. Lashevich, G. Lizdin, N. Muralov, A. Peterson, G. Piatakov, K. Solovev, L. Trotsky, G. Yevdokimov, G. Zinoviev) was addressed to the plenum but not incorporated into the record (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 2, d. 696, l. 68):

The question of the “affair” of Com. Lashevich, placed on the 24 June agenda of this plenum by decision of the Politburo, was turned into the “affair” of Com. Zinoviev at the very last moment by a 20 July resolution of the Central Control Commission. We consider it necessary to state that in the draft resolution of the Central Control Commission there is not a single fact, not a single report, not a single suspicion that was not known six weeks ago when the Central Control Commission passed a resolution on the “affair” of Com. Lashevich and others. The name of Com. Zinoviev does not appear in that resolution. Yet, in the final draft of the resolution it is stated completely categorically that “all threads” lead to Com. Zinoviev, as chairman of the Comintern Executive Committee. This matter, as is abundantly clear to everyone, was decided not by the Central Control Commission but by a group whose leader is Com. Stalin. We are dealing here with a new stage in the implementation of a plan that was conceived long ago and is being systematically carried out….

6) Not only should Lashevich be removed from the Central Committee, Zinoviev should be removed from the Politburo

By a decision of the July 1926 joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, Zinoviev was removed from the Politburo, and Lashevich was expelled as candidate member of the Central Committee (KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh [Resolutions of the CPSU], vol. 4 (Moscow, 1984], 36).

with a warning that he will be removed from the Central Committee if he does not cease his work in preparing a schism; 7) Either we strike this blow now with the calculation that Trotsky and the others will once again become loyal, or we risk turning the Central Committee and its bodies into nonviable institutions incapable of work, and we will very soon have to deal with a tremendous fuss in the party that will harm the cause and our unity; 8) It's possible that after this, Zinoviev will submit his resignation from the Comintern. We should accept it. At any rate, after being removed from the Politburo, Zinoviev can no longer be chairman; all the member parties will understand that and will draw the necessary conclusion themselves. In the Comintern, we will then shift from a system with a chairman to a system with a secretariat.

The VII expanded plenum of the Comintern's Executive Committee of 22 November 1926 voted to “relieve Com. Zinoviev of his deputies as chairman of the Comintern's Executive Commit tee and of his work in the Comintern.” The plenum eliminated the position of chairman of the Comintern's Executive Committee. A new executive body of the Comintern was formed: the Political Secretariat.

This will disarm the Zinoviev group and liquidate Zinoviev's arrogance in preparing the schism (remember what was said about Stockholm at the Congress!);

The reference is to Krupskaia's speech at the XIV Party Congress on 20 December 1925. At that time, in defense of Zinoviev, she said (XIV Congress of the Russian Communist Party [Bol shevik], Transcript [Moscow, 1926], 165, 166):

Our Congress must be concerned to search and find the correct line. That is its task. We cannot reassure ourselves with the idea that the majority is always right. The history of our party includes congresses when the majority was wrong. Let us recall, for example, the Stockholm Congress [IV Joint Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party in 1906, at which the Bolsheviks had fewer representatives than the Mensheviks]. The majority should not be content with being the majority but should dispassionately search for the correct decision.

9) I assure you that in the party and the country this affair will get by without

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the slightest complications — no one will feel sorry for Zinoviev, because they know him well; 10) Previously I had thought that a broad resolution on unity was needed at the plenum. Now I think that it would be better to leave such a resolution for the [XV] Conference ([where we could provide] a theoretical foundation and soon) or for the Congress. At the plenum, we can and should limit ourselves to a brief resolution on unity in the narrow sense of the word in connection with the Lashevich affair, citing Lenin's resolution on unity at the Tenth Congress.

In 1921, the X Party Congress passed a resolution banning factions within the party — U.S. Ed.

This resolution should say that Zinoviev is being removed from the Politburo not because of differences of opinion with the Central Committee — there are no less profound disagreements with Trotsky, after all, although the issue of removing Trotsky from the Politburo is not on the agenda — but because of his (Zinoviev's) policy of schism. I think this will be better: the workers will understand it, since they value party unity, and this will be a serious warning for the other opposition groups. Dzerzhinsky can be brought into the Politburo to replace Zinoviev. The party will take this well. Or the number of Politburo members can be raised to ten by bringing in both Dzerzhinsky and Rudzutak. Obviously, with a broad plenum resolution (the previous plan), we would be forced to unite Zinoviev and Trotsky officially in one camp, which is perhaps premature and strategically irrational now. Better to break them individually. Let Trotsky and Piatakov defend Zinoviev, and we will listen. At any rate that will be better at this stage. Then we'll see.

We'll speak in more detail when I come to Moscow. I think I'll be in Moscow three or four days before the plenum. What do you say to that?

P.S. I don't know about you, but I think that with the Lashevich affair, the Zinovievites have cut their own throats, especially if this affair is linked with the Guralski affair. And indeed it must be linked.

Best regards, J. Stalin.

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