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Information on the import plan, on loans, and on industrial crops was omitted from the Russian edition.

With regard to grain we are having difficulties that came to light in the spring. Three months later they disappeared, but then, in October, they have reappeared. What factors affect grain? I'm not speaking for the moment about [grain] collections and the specific circumstances of this year's harvest. First, the bad road season applies to October, although Alsky denies this. I propose that he travel to the Kuban and take a look at how one can cross from one side of the street to the other without riding horseback. The bad road conditions are a major factor. The same thing happened in 1925. We had a lot of grain lying at grain-collecting centers, yet we couldn't transport it out of them. But this, of course, isn't the only thing. If the weather improves, things will get better. But it isn't out of the question that the bad road season will last a long time. It may be short, or it may be long. But these are not economic reasons. There are reasons that affect Ukraine. In Ukraine, especially, the outline of the coming crop failure affects current grain procurements. We don't always grasp the importance of our own words. When we talk about the country's defense, everybody thinks we need to defend ourselves against military difficulties. We wrote a letter about these difficulties to the CC [Central Committee] plenum. If the muzhiks

A slightly condescending term for peasants except when used among peasants in which case it assumed a familiar and friendly connotation.

obey, they must also prepare to defend themselves. The muzhiks are no fools, especially if they have confirmation that the crop will be poor. We waited until October for it to improve, but it never did. The rains didn't come. This had a great impact in Ukraine. If the crops are poor, spring procurements may be ruined; if everything goes well, the procurements may improve. But if a drought occurs in June and May, the muzhiks will be more cautious.

Of course, the delivery of industrial goods is also important. But I think we have a more favorable situation with industrial goods in Ukraine this year than last year. Last year the Ukrainians complained more about a lack of industrial goods than this year. In any case, industrial goods are not the main factor. I believe the notion of a crop failure is of greater significance than industrial goods.

Now to peasants' reserves. It is true that they are increasing. First, they are increasing in other areas than before [sic]. The harvest is falling in the areas where we never focused to such an extent on procurements. This is where the muzhiks will set up reserves. For example, the Northern Caucasus is not of great importance with regard to the grain balance sheet, but it is of great importance in the commodity balance sheet. All this creates difficulties. I believe that in view of the war danger, in view of the simultaneous need to prepare for the crop failure—reserves may increase. The peasants are scared by the memory of 1921, when they ate even their own daughters, so they are creating reserves. The kulaks prefer not to focus on grain right now. They are shrewder and focus not only on grain but also on machinery and so forth. We must take account of the fact that the muzhiks are not fools, that they aren't stupid.

What will have to be changed in the control figures? I believe that with regard to grain we can't agree with Comrade Veitser concerning the 610 million [poods] and we can't agree to the figure that was adopted at yesterday's session—650 million. I think both of these figures are wrong. We must leave the procurement plan at 700 million [poods]. We can't give in too much. I believe that February and January will yield a larger amount of procurements. The quantity of goods will be greater. If you can't refute the TsSU [Central Statistical Administration] figures, you have no grounds to cut the grain plan. There are bad road conditions in Ukraine today, but tomorrow they may not be bad. The peasants are doing the right thing—sunflowers should be the first thing they sell. When they don't have enough money, they'll sell groats, and then they'll start selling rye as well. I believe that cuts here must not be excessive, even though the control figures require 740 [million poods]. But this is unrealistic, this is unfulfillable. I don't rule out the possibility that we may not be able to collect 700 million, but we must not set a goal of less than 660–670. We may even get 700. Veitser is proposing a figure below last year. This is wrong.

Do you remember the case with the Crimea? The Crimean comrades wrote that the Crimea would starve, there were telegrams to this effect both in June and July, yet the grain procurements in the Crimea were better than last year. They will have to be prosecuted for this. How can we trust such officials? This is a crime, because we can't distrust officials in the provinces, yet we can't trust them. People who say such things should be flogged and put in prison, so that they think about what they need to say before they talk. We must definitely get those telegrams, and if it was done by high-ranking party comrades, the matter should be turned over to the Central Control Commission.

The Central Control Commission (Tsentral'naia kontrol'naia komissia) of the AllUnion Communist Party, the highest control organ of the party from 1920 to 1934, was elected at party congresses and subordinated only to the congress. From 1923, the Central Control Commission combined its work with the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate (RKI or Rabkrin). At the seventeenth party congress in 1934 the Central Control Commission was replaced by the Commission of Party Control, directly subordinate to the Central Committee of the Communist party.

We must not give in to the provinces, we must criticize them. They want to insure themselves, they come up with minimum plans, yet their actual capabilities are greater.

Still, I favor a cut in the grain-export plan. I am for the previous grain procurement plan and for a cut in the grain export plan. We will have to give more grain to the areas with poor crops by cutting exports. We will have to give Central Asia 10 million and the Northern Caucasus 8 million.

I'm afraid we're going to lose a lot of grain from the reserve…. We will have to cut grain exports and set a plan of about 90 million [poods] instead of 195 [million poods]. Last year we had a different situation; this year, since we have to form a grain reserve,

The State Grain Reserve was a stock of grain and forage carried over from year to year and intended to meet the population's needs in cases of poor harvest or other disasters, and to meet the state's demands for grain and forage. It was also intended to eliminate irregularities in grain and forage supplies to grain-consuming regions and to moderate excessive increases in grain prices by releasing parts of the reserve to the market. The USSR Sovnarkom adopted the “Statute on the Permanent State Grain Reserve” on 11 January 1927. ( SZ [Svod zakonov] SSSR , 1927, no. 5, art. 49.) The STO determined the total size of the reserve yearly, based on data from the USSR Commissariat of Trade. The sanction of the Commissariat of Trade was necessary in order to make use of the reserve. The USSR Sovnarkom revised the statute on 22 February 1928. From that time, the USSR Commissariat of Trade was to determine expenditures from the reserve as well as grain procurement prices, based on directions from the STO. Under exceptional circumstances, the Trade Commissariat was allowed to expend the reserve without an appropriate STO decree, in an amount not exceeding five million poods per year, with subsequent reporting to the STO on each case of grain expenditure ( SZ SSSR , 1928, no. 14, art.123).

exports will be stronger in the second half of the year. So in the area of grain exports, I think, we should cut it to 90 million. We can talk about this amount. I am doing this because we must not fail to satisfy the domestic market with grain. We can't do anything else about this commodity, whereas we will do something about other commodities….