The situation is becoming more critical: Corona [Azaña] has declared to our Ministers that he does not see the possibility of victory, that the duration of the war means moving toward disaster and that now it is time to seek a way out. . . . He urges to request the Council of Ministers to raise the general problem of the prospects of the war. Blanche [Negrín] says that if Corona raises the question of capitulation there would be a crisis in the printing plant [government]. Blanche says that he agrees with us on all issues, but insists that our Ministers not exacerbate relations with Broukere [Prieto], who is declaring that he also considers an immediate military victory impossible unless he quickly obtains airplanes and weapons. . . . The Socialist leadership is demoralized. Despite the pressure [Blanche] is hesitant to accept our proposal for joint work, mobilization of the Popular Front, trade unions and the masses, to assist the government in quickly creating new reserves, to increase the production of barbed wire, political work at the front and in the rear. . . . The position of the administration [Communist Party] is the following: without making its campaign look as though it is in opposition to the government, ask it to take measures required by the situation, to do everything possible to involve the Socialists and the Popular Front in this campaign, request the inclusion of rint [CNT?] in the Popular Front, not to exacerbate the situation in the government and to act in agreement with Blanche. 29

29 RGASPI, f. 495, op. 184, d. 3, incoming 1938 from Spain, special, l. 18, sent 21 February 1938, received 23 February, deciphered 23 February. The term “rint” was not understood even by the cryptographer; possibly it referred to the anarcho-syndicalists, whose powerful trade union, the CNT, supported the Republic but refrained from direct participation in the government. They were referred to in Togliatti’s subsequent cipher correspondence.